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PEOPLE V. PATTERSON: CALIFORNIA'S SECOND
DEGREE FELONY-MURDER DOCTRINE AT
"THE BRINK OF LOGICAL
ABSURDITY"
I. INTRODUCTION
Felony-murder has been attacked as a concept "grossly misplaced in
a legal system which recognizes the degree of mental culpability as the
appropriate standard for fixing criminal liability."1 This is because the
underlying principle of criminal law is that criminal liability for causing
a particular result is justified only where some culpable mental state with
respect to that result exists.2 Under the doctrine of felony-murder, how-
ever, it is unnecessary to prove intent to kill or an intent to act with
conscious disregard for life.3 In contrast, an essential element of the
crime of murder is to act with malice aforethought.4 This is equivalent
to an intent to kill or an intent with conscious disregard for life to com-
1. Note, The Felony-Murder Rule: In Search of a Viable Doctrine, 23 CATH. LAW. 133,
160 (1977).
In People v. Washington, the California Supreme Court acknowledged the substantial
body of legal scholarship which had concluded that the doctrine incorporates an artificial con-
cept of strict criminal liability that "erodes the relations between criminal liability and moral
culpability." 62 Cal. 2d 777, 783, 402 P.2d 130, 134, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 446 (1965).
The Model Penal Code attempts to eliminate the fictitious connection which links the
culpability of committing an ordinary felony to that required for murder. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 210.2(l)(b) (1985). The Code requires that the minimum culpability for murder be
greater than reckless killing. Id. In addition to being reckless, the killing must be committed
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Id. Model
Penal Code section 210.2(l)(b) provides:
(1) Except as provided in Section 210.3(l)(b), criminal homicide constitutes mur-
der when ....
(b) it is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference
to the value of human life. Such recklessness and indifference are presumed if the
actor is engaged or is an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit,
or flight after committing or attempting to commit, robbery, rape or deviate sexual
intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary, kidnapping or felonious
escape.
Id. (emphasis added).
The Model Penal Code suggests that killing in the course of a dangerous felony should be
merely presumptive of the culpability required for homicide. Id. Thus, if the presumption is
rebutted, the killing in the course of a felony should be treated no differently than other
killings.
2. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1985).
3. People v. Satchell, 6 Cal. 3d 28, 43, 489 P.2d 1361, 1372, 98 Cal. Rptr. 33, 44 (1971).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1988).
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mit acts likely to kill.' Nonetheless, recognizing public sentiment favor-
ing tough penalties for criminal activity, it seems that legislators do not
want to appear to advocate a position considered "soft on crime."6
the goal of the felony-murder rule is to deter criminals from com-
mitting felonies with unnecessary violence which might result in death.7
To effectuate this goal, the felony-murder rule ascribes malice afore-
thought to the felon who kills in the perpetration of an inherently dan-
gerous felony.' In this way, the felony-murder doctrine allows courts to
hold criminals liable for all fatalities that occur during the commission of
a felony without requiring the state to establish a culpable mental state.9
First degree felony-murder is a statutory crime that applies to
deaths that occur during felonies such as robbery, burglary or rape.10
Second degree felony-murder, on the other hand, is a judicially-created
crime which refers to deaths that occur during lesser felonies such as
vehicular homicide."1 Both first and second degree felony-murder,
though, treat the intent to commit the underlying felony as a substitute
for the mens rea required to support a murder conviction.'
2
In recent years, the California Supreme Court has characterized the
second degree felony-murder doctrine as both "anachronistic"' 3 and
"disfavored."' 4 Specifically, the court has stated that second degree fel-
ony-murder "remains . . . a judge-made doctrine without any express
basis in the Penal Code"15 and suggested the need for legislative action
clarifying the parameters and application of the doctrine. 6
5. See People v. Thomas, 41 Cal. 2d 470, 476-77, 261 P.2d 1, 5 (1953) (Traynor, J.,
concurring); see also CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 187-189 (West 1988). Murder is defined as the
unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187.
6. Note, supra note 1, at 161.
7. People v. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d 824, 833, 678 P.2d 894, 900, 201 Cal. Rptr. 319, 325
(1984).
8. Satchell, 6 Cal. 3d at 43, 489 P.2d at 1372, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
9. People v. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d 441, 497, 668 P.2d 697, 733, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390, 426
(1983) (Bird, C.J., concurring).
10. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189.
11. See, e.g., People v. Watson, 30 Cal. 3d 290, 637 P.2d 279, 179 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1981).
12. Note, supra note 1, at 133; see also Satchell, 6 Cal. 3d at 43, 489 P.2d at 1372, 98 Cal.
Rptr. at 44.
13. People v. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d 574, 583 n.6, 414 P.2d 353, 360 n.6, 51 Cal. Rptr. 225,
232 n.6 (1966).
14. People v. Henderson, 19 Cal. 3d 86, 92, 560 P.2d 1180, 1183, 137 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4
(1977).
15. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d at 472 n.19, 668 P.2d at 715 n.19, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 408 n.19.
16. Id. The footnote states in pertinent part:
We recognize that from the standpoint of consistency the outcome of [case pre-
cedent] analysis leaves much to be desired. Although the misdemeanor-manslaugh-
ter rule is plainly a creature of statute, we reach the same conclusion as to the first
degree felony-murder rule only by piling inference on inference; and the second de-
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The court has previously exhibited its disfavor with the felony-mur-
der doctrine by placing restrictions on the application of second degree
felony-murder.17 One of these restrictions is that the felony involved
must be "inherently dangerous.""8 If the felony is not inherently danger-
ous, then the court cannot apply the second degree felony-murder rule. 19
Another restriction is that when determining whether the felony is inher-
ently dangerous, the court must consider the statute codifying the felony
"in the abstract"2 and "in its entirety."2
The court's continued uneasiness with the felony-murder doctrine
recently manifested itself in the sharply divided decision of People v. Pat-
terson.22 In Patterson, the issue was whether the felony-murder doctrine
should apply to a defendant who furnished cocaine to a person who died
by ingesting it.23 Having noted that the state legislature declined the
supreme court's suggestion to reconsider the application of first and sec-
ond degree felony-murder,24 the court again imposed its own limitations
on the use of the doctrine.25 The court's opinion reflects the difficulties
the California second degree felony-murder doctrine presents in its appli-
cation and raises questions about the doctrine's viability.
The California Supreme Court in Patterson, in a four to three deci-
sion, held that a drug dealer can be prosecuted for second degree felony-
murder only in circumstances where there is a high probability that fur-
nishing the drug would prove fatal.26 The previous standard for charging
second degree felony-murder, which the appellate court had applied, had
been whether a substantial risk that someone would be killed existed at
the time the felony was committed.27 By creating this "high probability"
gree felony-murder rule remains, as it has been since 1872, a judge-made doctrine
without any express basis in the Penal Code. A thorough legislative reconsideration
of the whole subject would seem to be in order.
Id. (citations omitted).
17. See infra notes 57-119 and accompanying text.
18. People v. Ford, 60 Cal. 2d 772, 795, 388 P.2d 892, 907, 36 Cal. Rptr. 620, 635, cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 940 (1964).
19. Id.
20. See infra notes 72-91 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 92-119 and accompanying text.
22. 49 Cal. 3d 615, 778 P.2d 549, 262 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1989).
23. Id. at 617, 778 P.2d at 551, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
24. Id. at 621, 778 P.2d at 554, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
25. See infra notes 165-99, 265-309 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Patter-
son court's limitations on the use of the second degree felony-murder doctrine.
26. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 618, 778 P.2d at 551, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
27. Id. at 628-29, 778 P.2d at 559, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 205 (Lucas, C.J., concurring and
dissenting). Chief Justice Lucas wrote:
We recently set forth in People v. Burroughs, another second degree felony murder
case, the correct and proper test for determining the inherent dangerousness of an
November 1990]
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standard, the Patterson court virtually eliminated felony-murder prose-
cutions for drug fatalities since few drug-related offenses pose a high
probability of death.28
Although the court appeared to try to limit the application of the
second degree felony-murder rule by creating this new, stricter standard
of inherent dangerousness, the court ironically expanded application of
the rule by concluding that the statute proscribing furnishing cocaine did
not need to be considered in its entirety to determine whether its viola-
tion was inherently dangerous.29 The well-established rule prior to Pat-
terson required that the statute be considered "in the abstract" and "in its
entirety" to determine whether the defendant's crime was inherently
dangerous.3 0 Applying this rule, the appellate court in Patterson held
that furnishing cocaine was not inherently dangerous since there are vari-
ous non-dangerous methods of violating the statute proscribing furnish-
ing cocaine.3 The supreme court, however, considered only the
individual offense actually committed by Patterson and not the entire
statute without expressly overturning the previous rule.32 In this way,
the new, higher standard of inherent dangerousness effectively swallowed
up the court's expansion of second degree felony-murder's application
created by the abandonment of the viewed in it's entirety standard. The
offense. There, we referred to a felony "inherently so dangerous that by its very
nature, it cannot be committed without creating a substantial risk that someone will
be killed."
Id. (quoting People v. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d 824, 833, 678 P.2d 894, 900, 201 Cal. Rptr. 319,
325 (1984)). The Chief Justice continued, "[T]his formulation was not the creation of the
Burroughs court. As one commentator has observed, citing English cases from 1887 and 1898,
at common law the second degree felony murder rule was 'limited by the requirement that the
commission of a felony involve substantial human risk."'" Id. (quoting Pike, Second Degree
Murder in California, 9 S. CAL. L. Rav. 112, 118 (1936)).
28. Chief Justice Lucas, vigorously dissenting to this new standard, asserted that the ma-
jority's "unrealistic, unwise and unprecedented" ruling would effectively bar most, if not all,
second degree felony-murder charges in deaths resulting from cocaine, heroin and other illicit
substances. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 628, 778 P.2d at 558, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 204 (Lucas, C.J.,
concurring and dissenting). Chief Justice Lucas also noted that, in applying the previous
standard,
the relevant question would be whether furnishing a particular drug such as cocaine
or heroin created a substantial risk of death. Although that test may be difficult for
the prosecution to meet, the majority's alternative test will entirely foreclose the pos-
sibility of a murder charge in all of these cases.
Id. at 629, 778 P.2d at 559, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 205 (Lucas, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
29. See infra notes 169-92, 268-92 and accompanying text.
30. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 630, 778 P.2d at 560, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 206 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring and dissenting). See infra notes 72-119 and 257-61 for a discussion of cases creating and
applying this requirement.
31. People v. Patterson, 247 Cal. Rptr. 885, 894-95 (1988) (depublished from official re-
porter), rev'd, 49 Cal. 3d 615, 778 P.2d 549, 262 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1989).
32. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 625, 778 P.2d at 556, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
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high probability standard will preclude the application of the doctrine to
most, if not all, drug furnishing cases.33 Thus, the California Supreme
Court has retained the felony-murder doctrine in conjunction with drug-
furnishing offenses, but it may have done so fictitiously.
This Note discusses the historical development of felony-murder
and second degree felony-murder in California prior to and including
People v. Patterson.34 This Note traces the origins of California's unique
"viewed in the abstract" and "in its entirety" requirements which pre-
clude consideration of the particular facts surrounding the commission of
a felony in determining whether felony-murder can be premised on a de-
fendant's crime.35 Next, in analyzing the reasoning in Patterson in light
of precedent, this Note illustrates why the supreme court should have
allowed the appellate court's dismissal of the murder charge to stand.3 6
In particular, this analysis demonstrates that the supreme court's reason-
ing was inconsistent with its own rules governing application of the sec-
ond degree felony-murder doctrine37 and that the Patterson court's
opinion illustrates the muddled state of the law governing the applicabil-
ity of the felony-murder doctrine. This Note then demonstrates how the
decision of the divided court in Patterson shows that the second degree
felony-murder doctrine is unworkable and, therefore, this Note proposes
reform.3 1 Specifically, this Note proposes that the second degree felony-
murder doctrine should be codified by the legislature and the specific
crimes upon which a charge of second degree felony-murder can be based
should be enumerated.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF FELONY-MURDER
Under early comnion law, one whose conduct brought about an un-
intended death in the commission or attempted commission of a felony
was guilty of murder.39 This was true regardless of whether the nature of
the felony involved was dangerous or whether death would ordinarily
occur from the defendant's conduct during the commission or attempted
commission of the felony.4° The rationale underlying the common law
approach was that all homicides were criminal regardless of the mental
33. Carrizosa, High Court OKs Murder Charges for Drug Deaths, L.A. Daily J., Sept. 8,
1989, at 1, col. 2.
34. See infra notes 39-199 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 72-119 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 251-319 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 251-319 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 320-47 and accompanying text.
39. 2 W. LAFAVE & A. ScOTr, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 7.5 (1986).
40. Id.
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state of the actor41 and therefore, like all felonies, were punishable by
death.42 As relatively minor offenses became classified as felonies, how-
ever, the felony-murder rule was limited to alleviate its harshness.43
In the 1887 case of Regina v. Sernd,4 an English court limited the
felony-murder doctrine by requiring that the defendant's conduct in
committing the felony involve an act of violence.4" The court reasoned
that "any act known to be dangerous to life, and likely in itself to cause
death done for the purpose of committing a felony which caused death,
should be murder."46 Courts in England further limited the felony-mur-
der doctrine by requiring that the death be a natural and probable conse-
quence of the defendant's conduct in committing the felony.47
In the United States, the law of felony-murder varies from state to
41. People v. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d 824, 838, 678 P.2d 894, 903, 201 Cal. Rptr. 319, 328
(1984) (Bird, C.J., concurring) (citing R. MORELAND, THE LAW OF HOMICIDE 1-4 (1952));
see also Robinson, A Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31 HASTINGS L.J.
815, 823 (1980) (culpability distinctions based upon actor's state of mind were ignored under
early common law); Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REv. 974, 977-81 (1932) (in recorded law
prior to twelfth century, criminal intent was not recognized as indispensable requisite for
criminality).
42. See 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 488 (2d ed.
1909).
43. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, JR., supra note 39, § 7.5. For example, by the 13th century,
an accidental killing, while not subject to acquittal, would entitle the person convicted to a
royal pardon. Perkins, A Re-examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L.J. 537, 539-40
(1934); see also Sayre, supra note 41, at 980.
The Church and canon law also created distinctions among homicides. Burroughs, 35
Cal. 3d at 839, 678 P.2d at 904, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 329 (Bird, C.J., concurring). The fundamen-
tal philosophy of canon law emphasized the importance of subjective moral blameworthiness
in assessing the degree of criminal culpability. Id. The Church refused to impose capital pun-
ishment on clerics accused of felonies. Note, Felony Murder as a First Degree Offense: An
Anachronism Retained, 66 YALE L.J. 427, 428-29 (1957). "Benefit of clergy," as this practice
was known, became a means of mitigating the common law's harsh approach to all homicides
regardless of mental state. Sayre, supra note 41, at 996-97.
In the 15th and 16th centuries, a series of statutes were enacted which abolished the
"benefit for clergy" if certain of the more culpable homicides were committed. Id. These
more culpable homicides, called murder, were distinguished as having been committed with
malice aforethought. Perkins, supra, at 543-44. All other homicides, for which benefit of
clergy was still available, developed into the crime of manslaughter. Id.
44. 16 Cox Crim. Cas. 311 (Q.B. 1887).
45. Id. at 313, quoted in S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND I1S PROCESSES
277 (3d ed. 1975).
46. Id.
47. Regina v. Horsey, 176 Eng. Rep. 129, 131 (Assiz. 1862) (defendant committed arson,
accidentally burning tramp to death in barn; jury instructed to convict for murder only if
death was natural and probable consequence of defendant's act in setting fire; if tramp entered
barn after fire was set, his death was not natural and probable consequence.) See W. LAFAVE
& A. ScoTr, JR., supra note 39, § 7.5.
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state.4" Many jurisdictions, however, limit the rule in one or more of the
following ways: (1) by permitting its use only as to certain types of felo-
nies;49 (2) by strictly interpreting the requirement of proximate or legal
cause; (3) by narrowing the time period during which the felony is in the
process of commission; or, (4) by requiring that the underlying felony be
independent of the homicide." The felony-murder doctrine is typically
based upon felonies which either inherently endanger human life51 or
which existed at common law.
5 2
In California, felony-murder is statutorily defined by degree.5 3 Sec-
tion 189 of the California Penal Code delineates several categories of
first- degree murder, including felony-murder, and provides that all other
kinds of murder are in the second degree.54
48. See generally Adlerstein, Felony-Murder in the New Criminal Codes, 4 AM. J. CRIM. L.
249 (1976) (statutory taxonomy of felony-murder law in United States).
49. The majority of jurisdictions restrict the application of the felony-murder rule to spe-
cific enumerated felonies. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, JR., supra note 39, § 7.5; see ALA. CODE
§ 13A-6-2 (Supp. 1982); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.110 (Supp. 1989); CAL. PENAL CODE § 189
(West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102(1)(b) (Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 636(a)(6) (Supp. 1988); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2401 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1)(a)
(West Supp. 1990); IDAHO CODE § 18-4003(d) (1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-1(a)(2)
(Bums Supp. 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1 (West Supp. 1990); MD. CRaM. LAW
CODE ANN. §§ 408-410 (Supp. 1989); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.548 (Callaghan 1982); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-303 (1989); NEv. REV. STAT. § 200.030(1)(b) (Supp. 1989); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 125.25(3) (McKinney 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01(1)(c) (1985); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2903.01(B) (Anderson 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.7B (West Supp.
1990); OR. REv. STAT. § 163.115(1)(b) (1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-1 (1981); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-3-20(c)(a)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-202(1)(d) to -
203(1)(d) (Supp. 1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2301 (Supp. 1989); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-
31 to -33 (Supp. 1990); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.030(c) (1988); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-
1 (1989); Wyo. STAT. § 2-101 (1988).
50. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, JR., supra note 39, § 7.5.
51. People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 780, 402 P.2d 130, 133, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 445
(1965) ("The felony-murder doctrine ascribes malice aforethought to the felon who kills in the
perpetration of an inherently dangerous felony.").
52. The common-law felonies are rape, sodomy, robbery, burglary, arson, mayhem, and
larceny. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, JR., supra note 39, § 7.5.
53. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (1988).
54. Id. California Penal Code section 189 provides in pertinent part:
All murder which is perpetrated by means of a destructive device or explosive, know-
ing use of ammunition designed primarily to penetrate metal or armor, poison, lying
in wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing,
or which is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape,
robbery, burglary, mayhem, or any act punishable under Section 288, is murder of
the first degree; and all other kinds of murders are of the second degree.
Id. The Crime Victims' Justice Reform Act, also known as Proposition 115, was approved by
California voters on June 5, 1990. L.A. Times, June 7, 1990, at A26, col. 2. The Act amended
section 189 to add five new offenses to the list of crimes leading to first degree felony-murder.
Review of Proposed Ballot Initiative "Crime Victims' Justice Reform Act" Proposition 115,
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A. The Development of Second Degree Felony-Murder in California
Unlike first degree felony-murder, there is no precise statutory defi-
nition of second degree felony-murder."5 Second degree felony-murder
has, however, been defined by the California Supreme Court as a "homi-
cide that is a direct causal result of the commission of a felony inherently
dangerous to human life [other than the felonies enumerated in section
189 of the California Penal Code that may give rise to first degree felony-
murder]." 56 Since defining second degree felony-murder, the California
Supreme Court has restricted its application by imposing four strict limi-
tations: (1) the felony must be "inherently dangerous"; 7 (2) the cause of
death must be independent of the underlying felony; 8 (3) the felony must
be inherently dangerous when "viewed in the abstract"; 9 and, (4) the
criminal statute must be inherently dangerous when considered "in its
entirety."'
1. The "inherently dangerous" standard
The first of the four limitations involves determining what is an "in-
herently dangerous" felony. Under common law, the commission of a
felony subject to the second degree felony-murder doctrine had to in-
volve substantial human risk.6 More recently, the California Supreme
Court similarly defined an "inherently dangerous" felony as one that by
its very nature cannot be committed without creating a substantial risk
that someone will be killed.62 Accordingly, the court has adopted the
common law.
CRIM. L. NEWS, June 1990, at 1, 8 (Special Edition). These include: kidnapping, train-wreck-
ing, sodomy, oral copulation, and any act punishable under Penal Code section 299. Id.
55. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1988).
56. People v. Ford, 60 Cal. 2d 772, 795, 388 P.2d 892, 907, 36 Cal. Rptr. 620, 635, cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 940 (1964). The underlying felonies in Ford were possession of a firearm by
an ex-felon and kidnapping, which were both held to be inherently dangerous. Id.
57. Id.
58. People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522, 450 P.2d 580, 75 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1969).
59. People v. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d 574, 414 P.2d 353, 51 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1966); People v.
Williams, 63 Cal. 2d 452, 406 P.2d 647, 47 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1965).
60. People v. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d 824, 678 P.2d 894, 201 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1984); People
v. Henderson, 19 Cal. 3d 86, 560 P.2d 1180, 137 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1977); People v. Lopez, 6 Cal.
3d 45, 489 P.2d 1372, 98 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1971).
61. Pike, What Is Second Degree Murder in California?, 9 S. CAL. L. REV. 112, 118
(1935). The "substantial risk of human death" standard was first expressed in Regina v. Sern6,
16 Cox Crim. Cas. 311 (Q.B. 1887). Id.
62. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d at 833, 678 P.2d at 900, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
[Vol. 24:195
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2. The "independent felony" limitation
The scope of the second degree felony-murder doctrine was further
restricted in People v. Ireland.6 3 In Ireland, the supreme court deter-
mined that a felony may not serve as the basis for a felony-murder charge
if the act which constituted the felony caused the victim's death." In
other words, the cause of the death must be independent of the underly-
ing felony. Under this approach, if the underlying felony is part of a
continuous course of conduct culminating in homicide, the underlying
felony is said to merge into the homicide and is not considered a separate
felony upon which the felony-murder rule can be predicated. 6 For ex-
ample, a person who commits assault with a deadly weapon cannot be
charged with felony-murder even if the assault caused the victim's
death.66
In Ireland, the defendant shot and killed his wife.67 The defendant
was convicted of second degree felony-murder.68 On appeal, the defend-
ant challenged a jury instruction on second degree felony-murder based
on assault with a deadly weapon.6 9 The California Supreme Court re-
fused to allow the crime of assault with a deadly weapon to predicate a
felony-inurder conviction, stating:
To allow such use of the felony-murder rule would effectively
preclude the jury from considering the issue of malice afore-
thought in all cases wherein homicide has been committed as a
result of a felonious assault-a category which includes the
63. 70 Cal. 2d 522, 450 P.2d 580, 75 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1969).
64. Id. at 539, 450 P.2d at 590, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
65. See id at 539-40, 450 P.2d at 590, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 198; see also Note, supra note 1, at
144.
66. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d at 539-40, 450 P.2d at 590, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
67. Id. at 527-28, 450 P.2d at 582-83, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
68. Id. at 525, 450 P.2d at 581, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
69. Id. at 538, 450 P.2d at 589, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 197. The jury instruction on murder
provided in part: "[T]he unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought is mur-
der of the second degree... when the killing is a direct causal result of the perpetration or
attempt to perpetrate a felony inherently dangerous to human life, such as an assault with a
deadly weapon. Id. The trial court then gave an instruction on the crime of assault with a
deadly weapon. Id.
On review, the supreme court concluded that the jury might have understood the instruc-
tion to mean that it should find defendant guilty of second degree murder if itfirst found that
defendant harbored malice aforethought and then found that the homicide had occurred in the
perpetration of the crime of assault with a deadly weapon. Id. at 539, 450 P.2d at 589, 75 Cal.
Rptr. at 197. Alternatively, the jury might have understood that it should find the defendant
guilty of second degree murder if it found only that the homicide was committed in the perpe-
tration of the crime of assault with a deadly weapon. Id. The latter understanding is the
correct meaning of the felony-murder doctrine because it would not have required the jury to
find malice aforethought. Id. at 539, 450 P.2d at 589-90, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 197-98.
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great majority of all homicides. This kind of bootstrapping
finds support neither in logic nor in law.70
The effect of the Ireland ruling was to remove violent felonies of the
assaultive variety from the reach of the felony-murder doctrine.71
3. The "viewed in the abstract" standard
In 1965, the supreme court further limited application of second de-
gree felony-murder by adding the requirement that the felony be "viewed
in the abstract."72 This requirement was presented in a footnote in Peo-
ple v. Williams,73 which read: "In determining whether the trial court
properly instructed on felony murder we look to the elements of the fel-
ony in the abstract, not the particular 'facts' of the case."74 In Williams,
the murder conviction was based on the felony of conspiracy to illegally
possess a narcotic drug.75 The court held that it was not an inherently
dangerous felony viewed in the abstract.7 6 Although the Williams court
gave no rationale for this requirement, the "viewed in the abstract" anal-
ysis has been defended as necessary to prevent the trier-of-fact from con-
cluding that, because someone was killed in the course of the commission
of the felony, that felony must be inherently dangerous.77
The "viewed in the abstract" requirement was applied and explained
in People v. Phillips.7" In Phillips, the defendant, a chiropractor, was
tried for murder following the death of his patient from cancer. 79 The
defendant had convinced his patient to undergo chiropractic treatment in
70. Id. at 539, 450 P.2d at 590, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
71. People v. Patterson, 247 Cal. Rptr. 885, 888 (1988) (depublished from official re-
porter), rev'd, 49 Cal. 3d 615, 778 P.2d 549, 262 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1989).
72. Williams, 63 Cal. 2d at 458 n.5, 406 P.2d at 650 n.5, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 10 n.5 (1965).
73. 63 Cal. 2d 452, 406 P.2d 647, 47 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1965).
74. Id. at 458 n.5, 406 P.2d at 650 n.5, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 10 n.5.
75. Id. at 455, 406 P.2d at 648, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
76. Id at 458, 406 P.2d at 650, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
77. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d at 830, 678 P.2d at 897-98, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 322-23. The Bur-
roughs court reasoned:
This form of analysis is compelled because there is a killing in every case where the
rule might potentially be applied. If in such circumstances a court were to examine
the particular facts of the case prior to establishing whether the underlying felony is
inherently dangerous, the court might well be led to conclude the rule applicable
despite any unfairness which might redound to the defendant by so broad an applica-
tion: the existence of the dead victim might appear to lead inexorably to the conclu-
sion that the underlying felony is exceptionally hazardous. We continue to resist
such unjustifiable bootstrapping.
Id.
78. 64 Cal. 2d 574, 414 P.2d 353, 51 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1966).
79. Id. at 577, 414 P.2d at 356, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
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lieu of surgery. 0 The defendant was charged with second degree felony-
murder based on the crime of grand theft by false pretenses.81
In determining whether the offense of grand theft was inherently
dangerous in the abstract, the court considered the statutory definition of
grand theft. 2 Consequently, the court refused to consider the entire
course of the defendant's conduct, including misrepresentations that he
could cure the cancer patient without surgery, thereby persuading the
patient to forego traditional medical care.83 The California Supreme
Court held that the crime of grand theft, viewed in the abstract, was not
inherently dangerous to human life since it could be committed without
substantial risk of death. 4 The court, therefore, acquitted Phillips.85
Considering the defendant's conduct, the crime of grand theft may
have been considered inherently dangerous because of the substantial risk
that someone who is not surgically treated for cancer will die. 6 Accord-
ing to the court, however, to consider the entire course of the defendant's
conduct would impermissably substitute the factual elements of his ac-
tual conduct for the statutory definition of the offense.87
The court also rejected the prosecution's attempt to fragment the
defendant's course of conduct and apply the felony-murder rule to any
segment of that conduct which may be considered dangerous to life.8"
The court reasoned that if such fragmentation of the defendant's course
of conduct were allowed, the application of felony-murder would be ex-
panded to encompass not only specific offenses which are independently
dangerous to life, but also any felony during which the defendant may
have acted in a manner dangerous to life. 89 To accept the prosecution's
approach would require the court to reject its holding in Williams that
80. Id. at 577-78, 414 P.2d at 356, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
81. Id. at 580-81, 414 P.2d at 358-59, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 230-31. A conviction for grand
theft requires proof that the victim relied on defendant's representations and that he actually
parted with value. Id. at 582, 414 P.2d at 359, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 231; see also CAL PENAL CODE
§ 487 (West Supp. 1990).
82. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d at 583, 414 P.2d at 361, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 233. Grand theft is
defined under CAL. PENAL CODE § 487 (West Supp. 1990). Section 487 reads in part: "When
the money, labor or real or personal property taken is of a value exceeding four hundred
dollars ($400)... then the same shall constitute grand theft." Id.
83. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d at 583, 414 P.2d at 361, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 233.
84. Id. at 581, 414 P.2d at 359, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
85. Id.
86. The treatment of choice for malignant eye cancer, from which the defendant suffered,
is surgical removal of the malignant tissue. McBride, Vallantyne, Hersh, McMurtrey, Rut-
ledge & Smith, Cancer of the Eye, in CANCER PATIENT CARE 437, 485 (1976).
87. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d at 581, 414 P.2d at 359, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
88. Id. at 583-84, 414 P.2d at 361, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 233.
89. Id.
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the felony-murder doctrine was limited to felonies which were indepen-
dently inherently dangerous to life.90 The Phillips court concluded: "We
have been, and remain, unwilling to embark on such an uncharted sea of
felony murder." 91
4. The viewed "in its entirety" requirement
In three cases subsequent to Phillips, the California Supreme Court,
applying the "viewed in the abstract" analysis, established that the statu-
tory definition of the offense must be viewed in its entirety as opposed to
examining the portion of the statute actually violated in the case at bar.
92
In People v. Lopez,93 the California Supreme Court reversed the defend-
90. Id. at 584, 414 P.2d at 361, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 233.
91. Id. Only one year after Williams, the court ignored its new "viewed in the abstract"
rule in People v. Ford, 65 Cal. 2d 41, 416 P.2d 132, 52 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1966), cert denied, 385
U.S. 1018 (1967). At his first trial, Ford had been convicted of first degree murder, but the
judgment was reversed because of errors in the instructions for first degree murder. People v.
Ford, 60 Cal. 2d 772, 775, 388 P.2d 892, 895, 36 Cal. Rptr. 620, 623 (1963) (en banc), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 940 (1964). At the time of reversal, the court had not yet decided Williams.
The court held that, as charged, the homicide was, as a matter of law, at least murder in the
second degree. Id. at 795, 388 P.2d at 908, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 636. In reaching this conclusion,
Justice Schauer pointed out that a homicide that is a direct causal result of the commission of
an inherently dangerous felony, other than the felonies enumerated in section 189 of the Cali-
fornia Penal Code, constitutes second degree murder. Id. He then ruled that the underlying
felonies of kidnapping and possession of a concealable weapon by an ex-felon were inherently
dangerous. Id.
The murder charge was retried and again the jury found Ford guilty and imposed the
death penalty. Ford, 65 Cal. 2d at 44, 416 P.2d at 134, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 230. Ford appealed
this judgment. Id. In the interim between Ford's appeal from his first trial and this second
appeal, the supreme court had ruled in Williams that the underlying felony must be inherently
dangerous in the abstract in order to support a felony-murder charge. 63 Cal. 2d at 458 n.5,
406 P.2d at 650 n.5, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 10 n.5. Nonetheless, during review of Ford's appeal from
his felony-murder conviction at his second trial, the court relied on Justice Schauer's pre-
Williams discussion of the inherent dangerousness of kidnapping and possession of a conceal-
able weapon by an ex-felon to affirm the conviction. The court, consequently, did not analyze
the felonies in the abstract. Id. at 57-58, 416 P.2d at 142-43, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 238-39. The
court cited to Justice Schaueres conclusion of the inherent dangerousness of kidnapping and
possession of a concealable weapon by an ex-felon to uphold the second degree felony-murder
conviction. Id. Justice Schauer's analysis of the inherent dangerousness of the underlying
felonies had preceded the new "in the abstract" requirement of Williams and should not have
been accepted summarily during a post-Williams review of Ford's conviction of second degree
felony-murder.
92. See Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d at 830, 678 P.2d at 898, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 323; Henderson,
19 Cal. 3d at 95, 560 P.2d at 1185, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 6; Lopez, 6 Cal. 3d at 51-52, 489 P.2d at
1376, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
93. 6 Cal. 3d 45, 489 P.2d 1372, 98 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1971). Lopez was convicted of second
degree murder and first degree robbery. Id. at 47, 489 P.2d at 1373, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 45. The
testimony at trial established that approximately three days after escaping from county jail, a
prisoner with whom the defendant had escaped broke into a house to obtain food, killed the
occupant and assaulted his wife. Id. at 48, 489 P.2d at 1373, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 45-46. Then, the
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ant's second degree murder conviction94 which had been based upon the
felony of escape from a county penal facility.95 The court held that the
felony was not, when considered in the abstract, an offense inherently
dangerous to human life and, therefore, could not be used as the basis for
a felony-murder conviction or instruction.96 The court reasoned:
[T]he crime of escape proscribed by [the statute] comprehends
a multitude of sins. It applies to the man who is tardy in re-
turning from a work furlough as well as to the man who obtains
a contraband weapon and decides to shoot his way out of jail
.... It applies to those who, like this defendant, fashion a rope
from blankets, climb down it, and steal into the woods as well
as to those who strangle a guard to obtain his key. We cannot
conclude that those who commit nonviolent escapes such as
those here suggested thereby perpetrate an offense which
should logically serve as the basis for the imputation of malice
aforethought in a murder prosecution. Because section 4532
draws no relevant distinction between such escapes and the
more violent variety, it proscribes an offense which, considered
in the abstract, is not inherently dangerous to human life and
cannot properly support a second degree felony-murder
instruction.97
The court applied the same reasoning as in Lopez in People v. Hen-
derson9 8 and again reversed felony-murder convictions. 99 The court
found that the trial court had erred in giving to the jury a second degree
felony-murder instruction based on the defendants' commission of the
felony of false imprisonment.c ° The court held that the offense of false
defendant and his fellow escapee took food, clothing and money from the house. Id. at 48, 489
P.2d at 1374, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 46. The two were captured shortly thereafter. Id.
94. Id. at 53, 489 P.2d at 1377, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 49. Lopez was convicted of second degree
murder, but in addition to the general second degree murder instruction, the trial court gave a
second degree felony-murder instruction. Id. at 49, 489 P.2d at 1374, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 46. The
court reversed the second degree murder conviction after concluding that the trial court's
giving of the second degree felony-murder instruction constituted error warranting reversal.
Id. at 52-53, 489 P.2d at 1377, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
95. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 4532 (West Supp. 1990).
96. Lopez, 6 Cal. 3d at 51, 489 P.2d at 1376, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
97. Id. at 51-52, 489 P.2d at 1376, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
98. 19 Cal. 3d 86, 560 P.2d 1180, 137 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1977).
99. Id. at 94-95, 560 P.2d at 1184-85, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 5-6.
100. Id. at 90, 560 P.2d at 1182, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 3. The defendants used a shotgun, a
pistol and a club to restrain a man they accused of stealing a television set. Id. at 91-92, 560
P.2d at 1182-83, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 34. When the accused thief attempted to escape, one of the
defendants inadvertently discharged his weapon and a bystander was fatally wounded. Id. at
92, 560 P.2d at 1183, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 4.
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imprisonment, in the abstract, was not a felony inherently dangerous to
human life and, therefore, did not warrant a second degree felony-mur-
der instruction.10 1 The court, in determining whether the offense of fel-
ony false imprisonment was inherently dangerous, provided a two-step
analysis:
First, we conclude that the primary element of the offense,
namely the unlawful restraint of another's liberty, does not nec-
essarily involve the requisite danger to human life. The aspect
of confinement... does not necessarily involve a hazard to the
victim's life. "The wrong may be committed by acts or by
words, or both, and by merely operating upon the will of the
individual or by personal violence, or both..."
Second, we consider whether the factors elevating the of-
fense [of false imprisonment] to a felony render [it] inherently
dangerous to human life. It is manifest that the four factors of
violence, menace, fraud, or deceit do not all involve conduct
which is life endangering .... [T]he felony offense viewed as a
whole in the abstract is not inherently dangerous to human
life.
10 2
The Henderson court implied that there could be situations in which
the statute need not be considered in its entirety. In reviewing the legis-
lative intent of the statute encompassing felony false imprisonment, the
court said it found no basis for severing false imprisonment by violence
or menace from the offense of felony false imprisonment stating, "[t]he
Legislature has not drawn any relevant distinctions between violence,
menace, fraud, or deceit.... The Legislature has not evinced a particu-
lar concern for violent as opposed to nonviolent acts of false imprison-
ment."103 Courts have interpreted this language to mean that if a court
finds evidence of legislative intent to distinguish between the offenses
grouped within a statute, the individual offenses, rather than the entire
statute, are to be considered in the abstract to determine the inherent
dangerousness of the offense."° Nonetheless, in the cases following Hen-
derson and prior to People v. Patterson,10 5 courts performing the "inher-
ently dangerous" analysis did not consider any statute other than in its
101. Id. at 94-95, 560 P.2d at 1184-85, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 5-6.
102. Id. at 93-94, 560 P.2d at 1184, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 5 (footnote omitted) (quoting People
v. Agnew, 16 Cal. 2d 655, 660, 107 P.2d 601, 603 (1940)).
103. Id. at 95, 560 P.2d at 1185, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
104. See, e.g., People v. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d 615, 624-25, 778 P.2d 549, 556, 262 Cal. Rptr.
195, 202 (1989).
105. 49 Cal. 3d 615, 778 P.2d 549, 262 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1989).
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entirety. 10 6
The California Supreme Court presented its third and most exten-
sive explanation of the "viewed in the abstract" notion in People v. Bur-
roughs.'°7 In reviewing the conviction, based upon the defendant's
felonious unlicensed practice of medicine,108 the California Supreme
Court applied the two-step analysis developed in Henderson. 109 It looked
first to the primary element of the offense at issue, then to the "factors
elevating the offense to a felony, to determine whether the felony, taken
in the abstract, was inherently dangerous to human life."' 110 The court
stated, "In this examination we are required to view the statutory defini-
tion of the offense as a whole, taking into account even nonhazardous
ways of violating the provisions of the law which do not necessarily pose
a threat to human life."'' At the second level of analysis, the court
concluded that infliction of great bodily harm could be other than inher-
ently dangerous to human life.' 1 2 The court reasoned that a broken arm
or leg, although painful and debilitating, does not jeopardize the life of
106. See id. at 630-33, 778 P.2d at 560-62, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 206-08 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
107. 35 Cal. 3d 824, 678 P.2d 894, 201 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1984). The defendant, Burroughs,
was a "self-styled healer" who was unlicensed to practice medicine and whose treatment of a
patient suffering from leukemia allegedly caused the patient to die of a massive hemorrhage.
Id. at 827-28, 678 P.2d at 896, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 321. The prescribed treatment had consisted
of an unorthodox diet, exposure to colored light and massages by defendant Burroughs. Id.
When the patient's condition began to deteriorate rapidly, Burroughs assured the patient that
all was going according to plan and persuaded him to postpone the medical tests urged by his
doctor. Id. at 828, 678 P.2d at 896, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 321. Additionally, Burroughs adminis-
tered deep abdominal massages and told the patient he would soon recuperate. Id. The pa-
tient did not recover, but began to suffer from convulsions and vomiting. Id. at 828, 678 P.2d
at 896, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 321. He eventually died of a massive hemorrhage of the mesentery in
the abdomen. Id. Evidence at trial strongly suggested the hemorrhage was the result of the
massages performed by Burroughs. Id. Burroughs was convicted of felony-murder since the
patient's death resulted directly from his felonious unlicensed practice of medicine. Id. The
unlicensed practice of medicine is proscribed in CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2053 (West 1990).
108. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2053.
109. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d at 830, 678 P.2d at 898, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 323; see also supra
notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
110. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d at 830, 678 P.2d at 898, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
111. Id. The primary element of the offense was the treatment of the sick without a license.
Id. The court reasoned that treatment of the sick is not inherently dangerous because there are
possible treatments of the sick which are harmless. Id. For example, a patient suffering from
the common cold or a sprained finger could be treated with an admonishment to rest in bed
and drink fluids or to apply ice to mild swelling. Id.
112. Id. at 831, 678 P.2d at 898, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 323. At the second level of analysis, the
court noted the statutory element which elevates the crime of practicing medicine without a
license to a felony includes "'circumstances or conditions which cause or create a risk of great
bodily harm, serious mental or physical illness, or death." Id. (quoting CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 2053 (West 1990)).
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the victim.113
The court accordingly held that committing the felony of practicing
medicine without a license, in the abstract, does not inevitably pose a
danger to human life and, therefore, could not serve as a predicate for a
finding of murder absent proof of malice.'11 Thus, Burroughs' second
degree felony-murder conviction was reversed."
15
The rule established in Lopez, Henderson, and Burroughs is une-
quivocal:' 16 if a statute prohibits several different types of conduct or
methods of commission of a crime, violation of the statute will not sup-
port a conviction for second degree felony-murder if any means by which
the crime may be committed is not inherently dangerous to human
life. "' The Burroughs court acknowledged that few offenses will qualify
for second degree felony-murder under its analysis." 8 In fact, Bur-
roughs, Henderson and Lopez removed non-violent felonies from the
reach of the felony-murder rule insofar as such felonies are incorporated
in statutes that make a great variety of acts felonious, including those
acts which are not inherently dangerous to human life." 19
B. The Application of Felony-Murder to Drug Offenses
Prior to People v. Patterson,2 the second degree felony-murder doc-
trine sometimes arose in cases involving drug offenses.' 2' Each of the
cases held that a second degree murder charge could be founded upon
the furnishing of illegal, dangerous drugs since the courts concluded that
the drug offenses were inherently dangerous to life. 122 None of the courts
considered the statute proscribing the drug offenses in the abstract or in
113. Id.
114. Id. at 832, 678 P.2d at 899, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
115. Id. at 833, 678 P.2d at 900, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
116. People v. Patterson, 247 Cal. Rptr. 885, 892 (1988) (depublished from official re-
porter), rev'd, 49 Cal. 3d 615, 778 P.2d 549, 262 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1989).
117. Id.
118. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d at 832-33, 678 P.2d at 899, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
119. Patterson, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 890.
120. 49 Cal. 3d 615, 778 P.2d 549, 262 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1989).
121. See, eg., People v. Poindexter, 51 Cal. 2d 142, 330 P.2d 763 (1958) (death resulting
from felony of furnishing narcotics to minor constitutes second degree felony-murder); People
v. Taylor, 112 Cal. App. 3d 348, 169 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1980) (furnishing heroin to victim who
dies after ingesting it constitutes second degree felony-murder); People v. Cline, 270 Cal. App.
2d 328, 75 Cal. Rptr. 459 (1969) (death resulting from felony of furnishing, selling or adminis-
tering narcotics to minor constitutes second degree felony-murder). All of the cases arose
before the creation of the "in its entirety" requirement.
122. See Poindexter, 51 Cal. 2d at 149, 330 P.2d at 767; Taylor, 112 Cal. App. 3d at 356,
169 Cal. Rptr. at 294; Cline, 270 Cal. App. 2d at 333-34, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 463.
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their entirety.123
The earliest of these cases was People v. Poindexter,124 decided in
1958. Poindexter involved a defendant convicted of second degree fel-
ony-murder based on the felony of furnishing narcotics to a minor.125
The defendant had sold thirty-five dollars worth of heroin to the victim
who later died of narcotics poisoning after ingesting it.126 The California
Supreme Court upheld the trial court's determinations that the sale of
heroin is an act dangerous to human life and death resulting from the
commission of the felony of furnishing, selling or administering narcotics
to a minor constituted second degree felony-murder. 127 Poindexter was
decided prior to People v. Williams 12' and the development of the
"viewed in the abstract" analysis; therefore, the court did not consider
the statute in its entirety or in the abstract when determining the inher-
ent dangerousness of furnishing narcotics to a minor.129
In People v. Cline,130 although decided after Williams and People v.
Phillips,"' the court disregarded the "viewed in the abstract" analysis.
In Cline, the underlying felony was violation of California Health and
Safety Code section 11912,132 which prohibits furnishing or administer-
ing any restricted dangerous drug without the prescription of a physi-
cian. 133 The defendant had furnished the victim with phenobarbital pills
which resulted in the victim's death. 3 Relying on the facts before it,
rather than analyzing the statute in the abstract, the appellate court con-
cluded that furnishing a controlled substance was inherently dangerous
to human life. The defendant was, therefore, found guilty of both the
drug offense and second degree felony-murder.
135
People v. Taylor 136 was another case in which furnishing heroin sup-
ported application of the felony-murder rule and the court again disre-
123. See supra notes 72-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "viewed in the
abstract" analysis.
124. 51 Cal. 2d 142, 330 P.2d 763 (1958).
125. Id. at 144, 330 P.2d at 765.
126. Poindexter, 51 Cal. 2d at 145-46, 330 P.2d at 765-66.
127. Id. at 149, 330 P.2d at 767.
128. 63 Cal. 2d 452, 406 P.2d 647, 47 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1965).
129. See id.
130. 270 Cal. App. 2d 328, 75 Cal. Rptr. 459 (1969).
131. 64 Cal. 2d 574, 414 P.2d 353, 51 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1966).
132. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11912 (repealed 1972) (current version at CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11352, 11379 (West 1975 & Supp. 1990)).
133. Cline, 270 Cal. App. 2d at 331, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 462; see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 11352 (West 1975 & Supp. 1990).
134. Cline, 270 Cal. App. 2d at 329-30, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 460.
135. Id. at 333-34, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 463.
136. 11 Cal. App. 3d 57, 89 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1970).
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garded the "viewed in the abstract" analysis. After reviewing its opinion
in Poindexter and the appellate court's resolution of Cline, the supreme
court stated: "It thus appears to be the law, at present, that the mere
furnishing of heroin is a felony inherently dangerous to human life which
will... support a felony-murder conviction."' 137 The court rejected Tay-
lor's argument that the rule of Williams and Phillips requiring the felony
to be considered "in the abstract" precluded the offense of furnishing
heroin from constituting an underlying felony to a felony murder
charge. 138 The court erroneously stated that that very point had been
considered in Cline and rejected.
1 39
To summarize, none of the felony-murder drug cases was resolved
based upon an analysis of the entire offense in the abstract. Conse-
quently, the issue of whether furnishing or administering narcotics is in-
herently dangerous had never been resolved using the "viewed in the
abstract and in its entirety" formulation prior to Patterson. As it stood at
the time Patterson arose, the rule of second degree felony-murder could
be articulated as follows: second degree felony-murder ascribes malice
aforethought to a felon who killed in the perpetration of an inherently
dangerous felony (other than the current six felonies enumerated in sec-
tion 189 of the California Penal Code)"4 unless the underlying felony
was part of a continuous course of conduct culminating in death.' An
"inherently dangerous" felony was a felony that by its very nature could
not be committed without creating a "substantial risk" that someone
137. Id. at 59, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
138. Id.
139. Id. Before Patterson, the most recent California Supreme Court case applying felony-
murder doctrine to a drug-furnishing offense was People v. Edwards, 39 Cal. 3d 107, 702 P.2d
555, 216 Cal. Rptr. 397 (1985). The second degree felony-murder charge rested upon the
felony of furnishing and/or administering heroin in violation of CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 11352 (West 1975 & Supp. 1990). The defendant, Edwards, and his girlfriend, neither
of whom had ever tried heroin, met another couple who suggested they buy some. Edwards,
39 Cal. 3d at 111, 702 P.2d at 557, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 399. Edwards and his girlfriend agreed to
share the cost of the heroin with their acquaintances who injected Edwards and the victim
with the drug. Id. Edwards' girlfriend died soon after of heroin poisoning. Edwards was
convicted of second degree felony-murder after the jury decided he had furnished the heroin to
his girlfriend. Id. at 112, 702 P.2d at 558, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 400. The court reversed the
felony-murder conviction and held that copurchasers of narcotics are not guilty of furnishing
narcotics to one another. Id. at 117, 702 P.2d at 561, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 403-04. Thus, the
court decided the case without ruling whether violation of section 11352 is inherently
dangerous.
140. People v. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d 824, 833, 678 P.2d 894, 900, 201 Cal. Rptr. 319, 325
(1984); see CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1988).
141. See People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522, 539, 450 P.2d 580, 590, 75 Cal. Rptr. 188, 198
(1969).
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would be killed.14 2 In determining whether the underlying felony could
serve as a predicate for felony murder, the court looked to the elements
of the felony in the abstract, not the particular facts of the case.143 In
applying the "viewed in the abstract" analysis, the statutory definition of
the offense was viewed as a whole, as opposed to examining the portion
of the statute actually violated in the case at bar."4
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE: PEOPLE V. PATTERSON
A. The Facts
On the night of November 25, 1985, Jennie Licerio and her friend
Carmen Lopez were with Sandy Patterson in his motel room.14 The
three drank "wine coolers," inhaled "lines" of cocaine furnished by Pat-
terson146 and smoked "coco puffs." 47 Licerio became ill and died of
acute cocaine intoxication within hours of ingesting the cocaine.
148
The state charged Patterson with murder, 149 possession of co-
caine' 50 and possession of cocaine for sale."' Patterson was additionally
charged with three counts of violating section 11352 of the California
Health and Safety Code152 for "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
transport[ing], import[ing] into the State of California, sell[ing], fur-
nish[ing], administer[ing], and giv[ing] away, and attempt[ing] to import
into the State of California and transport[ing] a controlled substance, to-
wit: cocaine."'
153
In the superior court, Patterson moved to dismiss the murder count
on the basis that the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing did
not establish probable cause to believe he had committed murder. 154 In
opposition to the motion, the People relied on the second degree felony-
142. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d at 833, 678 P.2d at 900, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
143. People v. Williams, 63 Cal. 2d 452, 458 n.5, 406 P.2d 647, 650 n.5, 47 Cal. Rptr. 7, 10
n.5 (1965).
144. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d at 830, 678 P.2d at 898, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
145. People v. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d 615, 618, 778 P.2d 549, 551, 262 Cal. Rptr. 195, 197
(1989).
146. Id. at 618, 778 P.2d at 551-52, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 197-98.
147. Id. At trial, "coco-puffs" were defined as hand-rolled cigarettes containing a mixture
of tobacco and cocaine. Id.
148. Id. at 618, 778 P.2d at 552, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
149. Id.; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1988).
150. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 618, 778 P.2d at 552, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 198; see CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 11350 (West 1975 & Supp. 1990).
151. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 618, 778 P.2d at 552, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 198; see CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 11351 (West 1975 & Supp. 1990).
152. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11352 (West 1975 & Supp. 1990).
153. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 618, 778 P.2d at 552, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
154. Id.
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murder doctrine and argued that by furnishing cocaine, Patterson had
committed an inherently dangerous felony that justified application of
the rule.15  The court, however, dismissed the murder charge.156 The
trial judge announced that he had considered the elements of the particu-
lar crime committed by Patterson in the abstract and concluded that fur-
nishing cocaine was not an inherently dangerous act.157 Patterson then
entered a negotiated plea of guilty to the three counts of violating section
11352 of the Health and Safety Code. l s8
The People appealed the dismissal of the murder charge.15 9 The Cal-
ifornia Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's decision, even though
the trial court's dismissal of the second degree felony-murder charge was
based on consideration of the facts of Patterson's particular crime, fur-
nishing cocaine, rather than on section 11352 viewed in the abstract and
in its entirety.
16
Precedent compelled the appellate court to analyze section 11352 in
its entirety to determine whether Patterson had committed an inherently
dangerous felony. 161 The court concluded that section 11352 could be
violated in ways not inherently dangerous to human life such as trans-
155. Id. at 619, 778 P.2d at 552, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
156. Id. Patterson had moved to dismiss the murder count on the basis that furnishing
cocaine is not an inherently dangerous felony. People v. Patterson, 247 Cal. Rptr. 885, 886
(1988) (depublished from official reporter), rev'd, 49 Cal. 3d 615, 778 P.2d 549, 262 Cal. Rptr.
195 (1989). The motion was denied. Id. However, when the case was reassigned for trial, in
an off-the-record conference with both counsel, the trial court indicated it did not believe de-
fendant had committed an inherently dangerous felony, and, if facts similar to those presented
at the conference were presented at trial, the court would be inclined to grant a defense motion
for a judgment of acquittal on the murder charge at the close of the prosecution's case.
Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 619 n.1, 778 P.2d at 552 n.1, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 198 n.1. The parties
then went on record and the prosecutor suggested that the court dismiss the murder charge on
its own motion from which the People could appeal. Id. The trial judge announced he had
considered the elements of the offense of furnishing cocaine in the abstract, and in his opinion,
the offense was not an inherently dangerous act. Id. at 619, 778 P.2d at 552, 262 Cal. Rptr. at
198. The court then dismissed the murder charge on its own motion in the interest of justice.
Id. The minute order failed, however, to detail any reasons for the dismissal. Patterson, 247
Cal. Rptr. at 886.
157. Patterson, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
158. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 619, 778 P.2d at 552, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
159. Id. The district attorney appealed pursuant to section 1238(a)(8) of the California
Penal Code. Id.; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 1238(a)(8) (West Supp. 1990). That section pro-
vides for a prosecution appeal from "[ain order or judgment dismissing or otherwise terminat-
ing the action before the defendant has been placed in jeopardy or where the defendant has
waived jeopardy." § 1238(a)(8).
160. Patterson, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
161. Id. at 889. The appellate court based its decision on a series of supreme court cases
which held that, to determine a felony's inherent dangerousness, the statute as a whole had to
be examined. See, eg., People v. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d 824, 678 P.2d 894, 201 Cal. Rptr. 319
(1984); People v. Henderson, 19 Cal. 3d 86, 560 P.2d 1180, 137 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1977); People v.
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porting or offering to transport controlled substances.162 Although in the
present case the defendant had violated the statute by furnishing cocaine
to the victim, viewing the statute in the abstract, a violation of section
11352 could not be characterized as an inherently dangerous felony be-
cause furnishing cocaine is not necessarily inherently dangerous.
16 3
Upon review of the appellate court's opinion, a divided California
Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision and directed the court
to remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent
with the supreme court's opinion."6
B. Reasoning of the Court
1. The majority opinion
Justice Kennard, writing for the majority in People v. Patterson,6 '
stated that the appellate court had interpreted second degree felony-mur-
der precedent too broadly.'66 The established rule in California, as an-
nounced in People v. Williams, 6 7 was that, to determine whether a felony
is inherently dangerous to human life under the second degree felony-
murder doctrine, the court must consider" 'the elements of the felony in
the abstract, not the particular 'facts' of the case.' "68
The supreme court reaffirmed the "viewed in the abstract" rule but
held that the appellate court had erred in considering section 11352 of
the California Health and Safety Code 169 as a whole. 170 The court rea-
soned that "[i]n determining whether the defendant had committed an
inherently dangerous felony, the court should have considered only the
particular crime at issue, namely, furnishing cocaine, and not the entire
Lopez, 6 Cal. 3d 45, 489 P.2d 1372, 98 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1971). See supra notes 72-119 and
accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
162. Patterson, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 893-94.
163. Id. at 894-95.
164. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 618, 778 P.2d at 551, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 197. Justice Kennard
wrote the majority opinion. Id. at 617, 778 P.2d at 551, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 197. Justice Lucas
wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion in which Justices Eagleson and Kaufman
concurred. Id. at 627, 778 P.2d at 558, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 204 (Lucas, C.J., concurring and
dissenting). Justice Mosk wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion in which Justice
Broussard concurred. Id. at 630, 778 P.2d at 560, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 206 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting). Justice Panelli also wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion. Id. at
641, 778 P.2d at 567, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 213 (Panelli, J., concurring and dissenting).
165. 49 Cal. 3d 615, 778 P.2d 549, 262 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1989).
166. Id. at 620, 778 P.2d at 553, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
167. 63 Cal. 2d 452, 458 n.5, 406 P.2d 647, 650 n.5, 47 Cal. Rptr. 7, 10 n.5 (1965).
168. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 622, 778 P.2d at 554, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 200 (quoting People v.
Williams, 63 Cal. 2d 452, 458 n.5, 406 P.2d 647, 650 n.5, 47 Cal. Rptr. 7, 10 n.5 (1965)).
169. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11352 (West 1975 & Supp. 1990).
170. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 625, 778 P.2d at 556, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
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group of offenses included in the statute but not involved here." 171
The court purported to distinguish the situation in Patterson from
prior cases which had held that in determining whether an offense was
inherently dangerous, the court should examine the statute in its entirety
and not the particular facts of the case at hand.172 The majority deter-
mined that the prior cases, People v. Lopez, 173 People v. Henderson 174 and
People v. Burroughs,17 involved statutes that proscribed "an essentially
single form of conduct"1 76 or "primary element"177 whereas section
11352 grouped together a number of related but distinct crimes.178
The majority reasoned that, although the statute violated in People
v. Lopez, section 4532 of the California Penal Code 179 "comprehends a
multitude of sins,"' 0 it proscribes in essence one offense: escape.' 81 It
also observed that, in People v. Henderson, the offense of felony false im-
prisonment codified in section 236 of the California Penal Code 18 2 has a
primary element, the unlawful restraint of another's liberty.18 3 Lastly,
the Patterson court found that, in People v. Burroughs, the primary ele-
ment of section 2053 of the California Business and Professions Code184
is the practice of medicine without a license.185
The Patterson majority reasoned that when a statute has no primary
element but instead groups together a variety of offenses, the statute need
not be considered as a whole if there is a basis for severing the various
types of conduct it prohibits.1 8 6 The majority concluded that section
11352 is such a statute.'8 7 The majority pointed out that section 11352
171. Id. at 620, 778 P.2d at 553, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
172. Id. at 623-24, 778 P.2d at 555, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 201. See supra notes 93-119 and
accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
173. 6 Cal. 3d 45, 489 P.2d 1372, 98 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1971). See supra notes 93-97 and
accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
174. 19 Cal. 3d 137, 560 P.2d 1180, 137 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1977). See supra notes 98-106 and
accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
175. 35 Cal. 3d 824, 678 P.2d 894, 201 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1984). See supra notes 107-15 and
accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
176. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 623, 778 P.2d at 555, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 201.
177. Id. at 624, 778 P.2d at 556, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
178. Id.
179. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4532 (West Supp. 1990).
180. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 624, 778 P.2d at 556, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
181. Id.
182. CAL. PENAL CODE § 236 (West 1988).
183. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 624, 778 P.2d at 556, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
184. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2053 (West 1990).
185. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 624, 778 P.2d at 556, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 625, 778 P.2d at 556, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
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incorporates "more than 100 different controlled substances." '188 The
court asserted that to separately prohibit acts, such as transporting, im-
porting, selling, furnishing and administering drugs, the legislature
would be required to enact hundreds of individual statutes.8 9 The ma-
jority then concluded that the various offenses were included in one stat-
ute by the legislature "for the sake of convenience."' 90 For this reason,
the court held that the offense of furnishing cocaine could be severed
from the other offenses set forth in the statute and its inherent danger-
ousness considered separately and in the abstract.' 91 According to the
majority, the determination of whether a defendant who furnishes co-
caine commits an inherently dangerous felony should not turn on the
dangerousness of each and every offense set forth in the statute but
should turn on the danger to life inherent in the transportation or ad-
ministering of cocaine. 
192
The majority declined to rule on whether the offense of furnishing
cocaine was sufficiently dangerous to life to constitute an inherently dan-
gerous felony. 193 The majority felt that the task of evaluating the evi-
dence on this issue was more appropriate for the trial court. 94
Consequently, the supreme court remanded the matter to the trial court
to determine whether the crime of furnishing cocaine was inherently dan-
gerous and an offense upon which felony-murder charges could be
based. 195
To assist the trial court on remand, the majority defined the mean-
ing of the term "inherently dangerous to human life" for purposes of the
second degree felony-murder doctrine as a felony in which there is a
"high probability" that its commission will result in death. 196 The ma-
jority indicated that the "high probability" definition of "inherently dan-
gerous to life" in the context of second degree murder was well-
established,197 citing a series of California Supreme Court cases in which
the standard had been applied.198 According to the court, a less-strin-
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 627, 778 P.2d at 558, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 204.
197. Id. at 626, 778 P.2d at 558, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 204.
198. Id. at 627, 778 P.2d at 558, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 204 (citing People v. Davenport, 41 Cal.
3d 247, 710 P.2d 861, 221 Cal. Rptr. 794 (1985); People v. Watson, 30 Cal. 3d 290, 637 P.2d
279, 179 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1981); People v. Poddar, 10 Cal. 3d 750, 518 P.2d 342, 111 Cal. Rptr.
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gent standard would "inappropriately expand the scope of the second
degree felony-murder rule." 199
2. Chief Justice Lucas' concurring and dissenting opinion
Chief Justice Lucas, concurring with the majority decision,2
agreed that the court should reinstate the murder charge against Patter-
son.20 1 In support, the Chief Justice cited previous California cases in
which the felony-murder doctrine was applied to drug furnishing
offenses.2°2
Chief Justice Lucas dissented, however, from the majority's defini-
tion of an inherently dangerous crime as one which poses a high
probability of death.2 3 He called Justice Kennard's new formulation of
the standard for determining inherent dangerousness "unrealistic, unwise
and unprecedented." 2  Chief Justice Lucas would have applied the sub-
stantial risk standard instead, recognizing that inherent dangerousness
was not defined in any prior drug-furnishing cases. 205 He relied on other
second degree felony-murder cases and concluded that the established
test in California is whether "'by its very nature, [the felony] cannot be
committed without creating a substantial risk that someone will be killed
,,206
The Chief Justice further criticized the majority of the court, noting
that with "one broad, gratuitous stroke, the majority has precluded ap-
plication of the second degree felony-murder doctrine to most, if not all,
drug furnishing offenses (as well as many nondrug offenses), thereby
910 (1974); People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966); People v.
Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965); and People v. Thomas, 41
Cal. 2d 470, 261 P.2d 1 (1953)).
199. Id.
200. Justices Eagleson and Kaufman also joined in Chief Justice Lucas' concurrence. Pat-
terson, 49 Cal. 3d at 630, 778 P.2d at 560, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 206 (Lucas, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
201. Id. at 627, 778 P.2d at 558, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 204 (Lucas, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
202. Id. at 627-28, 778 P.2d at 558-59, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 204-05 (Lucas, C.J., concurring
and dissenting) (citing People v. Mattison, 4 Cal. 3d 177, 185, 481 P.2d 193, 198-99, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 185, 190-91 (1971) (furnishing methyl alcohol); People v. Taylor, 11 Cal. App. 3d 57, 63,
89 Cal. Rptr. 697, 699 (1970) (furnishing heroin)).
203. Id. at 628, 778 P.2d at 558, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 204 (Lucas, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
204. Id. (Lucas, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
205. Id. (Lucas, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
206. Id. at 628-29, 778 P.2d at 559, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 205 (Lucas, C.J., concurring and
dissenting) (quoting People v. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d 824, 833, 678 P.2d 894, 900, 201 Cal.
Rptr. 319, 325 (1984)).
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overruling or disapproving, sub silentio, several prior cases2 0 7 of this
court and the Court of Appeal. ' 28  Chief Justice Lucas felt the new
"high probability of death" standard was particularly inopportune in
light of the current "serious 'crack' cocaine crisis of epidemic propor-
"1209tions ....
Chief Justice Lucas stated that the majority's "high probability of
death" standard may be appropriate for measuring whether a defendant's
conduct should warrant an independent murder charge based on implied
malice.210 He emphasized, however, that use of this standard is inappro-
priate for determining whether felonious conduct should bootstrap a re-
sulting death into a murder charge.211 The Chief Justice reasoned that
implied malice should not be "imported into felony murder, where the
commission of the felony itself acts as a substitute for malice.
'212
Chief Justice Lucas criticized the majority's holding as an anomaly,
observing that first degree felony-murder 21 3 encompasses such offenses as
burglary, robbery, rape or child molestation, none of which, when viewed
in the abstract, involves a high probability of death.214 Chief Justice Lu-
cas reasoned that if a first degree murder charge can be based on an
offense not involving a high probability of death, the lesser charge of
second degree murder can be based on similar offenses, "so long as the
requisite substantial risk of death can be demonstrated.,
215
The Chief Justice stressed that the purpose of the felony-murder
207. See, e.g., People v. Poindexter, 51 Cal. 2d 142, 330 P.2d 763 (1958) (furnishing narcot-
ics to a minor); People v. Taylor, 112 Cal. App. 3d 348, 169 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1980) (furnishing
heroin); People v. Cline, 270 Cal. App. 2d 328, 75 Cal. Rptr. 459 (1969) (furnishing
phenobarbital).
208. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 628, 778 P.2d at 558, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 204 (Lucas, C.J.,
concurring and dissenting) (emphasis added).
209. Id. at 628, 778 P.2d at 559, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 205 (Lucas, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
210. Id. at 629, 778 P.2d at 559, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 205 (Lucas, C.J., concurring and
dissenting). Section 187 of the California Penal Code provides that "[m]urder is the unlawful
killing of a human being... with malice aforethought." CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West
1988). Malice may be express or implied, and implied malice is present "when no considerable
provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and
malignant heart." Id. § 188.
211. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 629, 778 P.2d at 559, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 205 (Lucas, C.J.,
concurring and dissenting).
212. Id. (Lucas, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
213. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1988).
214. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 629, 778 P.2d at 560, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 206 (Lucas, C.J.,
concurring and dissenting).
215. Id. (Lucas, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
November 1990]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:195
rule is to deter the commission of inherently dangerous felonies.216 He
argued that this purpose is advanced by deterring offenses bearing only a
substantial risk of death, as well as those involving a high probability of
death.
217
3. Justice Mosk's concurring and dissenting opinion
Justice Mosk concurred both in the result and with the majority's
definition of an inherently dangerous felony as a felony carrying a high
probability that death will occur.218 Justice Mosk opined that the high
probability standard "will contribute to greater fairness and proportion
in the application of the second degree felony-murder rule. ' 219 Justice
Mosk dissented, however, from the majority's fragmentation of section
11352 of the Health and Safety Code220 to consider the distinct felony of
furnishing cocaine.221 He argued that the correct analysis is whether a
violation of section 11352, when considered in its entirety, is a felony
inherently dangerous to human life.222
Justice Mosk first discussed prior second degree felony-murder cases
in which the felony offense, as defined by statute, embraced a variety of
both violent and nonviolent conduct. 223 In People v. Phillips,224 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court had refused to fragment the defendant's course of
conduct in order to apply the felony-murder rule to any segment of that
conduct considered dangerous to life.225 According to the Phillips court,
216. Id. at 629, 778 P.2d at 559, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 205 (Lucas, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
217. Id. (Lucas, C.J., concurring and dissenting). Chief Justice Lucas cited People v. Tay-
lor, in which the court stated "knowledge that the death of a person to whom heroin is fur-
nished may result in a conviction for murder should have some effect on the defendant's
readiness to do the furnishing." 11 Cal. App. 3d 57, 63, 89 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1970), quoted
with approval in People v. Mattison, 4 Cal. 3d 177, 185, 481 P.2d 193, 198-99, 93 Cal. Rptr.
185, 190-91 (1971).
218. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 640, 778 P.2d at 567, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 213 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring and dissenting). Justice Broussard and Justice Panelli also joined in Justice Mosk's con-
currence and dissent. However, Justice Panelli wrote a separate opinion. Id. at 641, 778 P.2d
at 567, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 213 (Panelli, J., concurring and dissenting). See infra notes 245-250
and accompanying text for a discussion of his opinion.
219. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 640, 778 P.2d at 567, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 213 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
220. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11352 (West 1975 & Supp. 1990).
221. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 630, 778 P.2d at 560, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 206 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
222. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
223. Id. at 630-33, 778 P.2d at 560-62, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 206-08 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
224. 64 Cal. 2d 574, 414 P.2d 353, 51 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1966).
225. Id. at 583-84, 414 P.2d at 361, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 233. In Phillips, the defendant was
convicted of second degree murder. Id. at 577, 414 P.2d at 356, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 228. A
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to fragment the defendant's course of conduct and abandon the statutory
definition of the felony would embark the court on "an uncharted sea of
felony-murder." '226 Felony-murder would apply to the perpetration of
any felony during which the defendant endangered life rather than to the
commission of felonies which by their nature are dangerous to life.2 27
In addition, Justice Mosk cited the trilogy of People v. Lopez,228 Peo-
ple v. Henderson,229 and People v. Burroughs230 for the previously well-
established rule that, if a statute prohibits several different types of con-
duct or methods of commission, violation of the statute will not support
a conviction for second degree felony-murder if any means by which the
crime may be committed is not inherently dangerous to human life.231
Justice Mosk stated that this same reasoning was applicable to the facts
of Patterson since the California Legislature had not "'drawn any rele-
vant distinctions' "between trafficking by furnishing cocaine and traffick-
ing by importing, transporting or selling cocaine or any other controlled
substance.232
Justice Mosk next reviewed the legislative history of section
second degree felony-murder instruction was given to the jury. Id. The underlying felony was
grand theft. Id. at 580, 414 P.2d at 359, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 231. The court held that a felony-
murder instruction could not be predicated on grand theft since, as the offense was defined in
section 484 of the California Penal Code, it was not inherently dangerous to human life. Phil-
lips, 64 Cal. 2d at 583-84, 414 P.2d at 361, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 233; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 484
(West 1988).
226. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d at 584, 414 P.2d at 361, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 233.
227. Id.
228. 6 Cal. 3d 45, 489 P.2d 1372, 98 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1971). See supra notes 93-97 for a
discussion of this case.
229. 19 Cal. 3d 86, 560 P.2d 1180, 137 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1977). See supra notes 98-106 and
accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
230. 35 Cal. 3d 824, 678 P.2d 894, 201 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1984). See supra notes 107-15 and
accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
231. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 631-33, 778 P.2d at 561-62, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 207-08 (Mosk, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
232. Id. at 639, 778 P.2d at 567, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 213 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting)
(quoting People v. Henderson, 19 Cal. 3d 86, 95, 560 P.2d 1180, 1185, 137 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6
(1977)). In Henderson, the court stated:
The Legislature has not drawn any relevant distinctions between violence, menace,
fraud, or deceit .... Most significantly, the Legislature has not distinguished be-
tween false imprisonment effected by violence or menace on the one hand and false
imprisonment effected by nonviolent methods of fraud or deceit on the other. The
Legislature has not evinced a particular concern for violent as opposed to nonviolent
acts of false imprisonment by separate statutory treatment, proscription, or
punishment.
Henderson, 19 Cal. 3d at 95, 560 P.2d at 1185, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 6. See supra notes 98-106 and
accompanying text for a complete discussion of Henderson.
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11352.233 He concluded that the prohibited acts listed in section
11352234 should be read in unison since the legislature adopted the entire
list at once, rather than piecemeal over the years.235 Further, he noted
that section 11352 was adopted as part of a legislative plan called the
California Uniform Controlled Substances Act236 which effectively re-
placed all the laws governing legal and illegal narcotics in California.
237
Justice Mosk indicated that the legislative plan set forth six distinct
aspects of conduct involving "hard" drugs, such as opium, heroin and
cocaine, that the legislature chose to prohibit and separately punish.2 8
Justice Mosk reasoned that when section 11352 is viewed in the context
of the legislative plan as a whole, it prohibits different ways of engaging
in the same targeted criminal conduct-drug trafficking-and this crime
is the same whether the transfer of the illegal narcotic is accomplished by
selling, furnishing or administering it.
239
In support of this conclusion, Justice Mosk pointed out that "it has
long been held that when [a] statute enumerates a series of acts of which
any one can constitute a violation, several or even all [of] the acts may
properly be charged in one count because the statute nevertheless de-
clares only 'one offense.' "2I Consistent with this reasoning, violation of
any number of the acts listed in section 11352 constitutes a single viola-
tion of the statute.24 1 Therefore, according to Justice Mosk, absent evi-
dence of the legislature's particular concern for the single offense of
furnishing cocaine, a court applying the "inherently dangerous" prong of
the felony-murder analysis must consider whether violation of section
233. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 634, 778 P.2d at 563, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 209 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
234. Section 11352 punishes "every person who transports, imports into [California], sells,
furnishes, administers, or gives away" any of certain controlled substances without a valid
prescription. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11352.
235. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 635, 778 P.2d at 563, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 209 (Mosk, 3., concur-
ring and dissenting).
236. Uniform Controlled Substances Act, ch. 1407, § 11352, 1972 Cal. Stat. 3013 (1972)
(codified as amended at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11352 (West 1975 & Supp. 1990)).
237. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 635, 778 P.2d at 564, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 210 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring and dissenting) (citing Uniform Controlled Substances Act, ch. 1407, 1972 Cal. Stat. 2986
(1972) (codified as amended at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11352 (West 1975 & Supp.
1990)).
238. Id
239. Id. at 637-38, 778 P.2d at 565, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 211 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
240. Id. at 638, 778 P.2d at 565, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 211 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting)
(citation omitted).
241. Id. at 639, 778 P.2d at 566, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 212 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
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11352 as a whole is inherently dangerous to human life.2 42
Justice Mosk concluded that he would affirm the judgment of the
Court of Appeal that a violation of section 11352 cannot predicate a
charge of second degree felony-murder.243 Violation of section 11352 as
a whole is not so inherently dangerous that by its very nature it cannot be
committed without creating a substantial risk that someone will be
killed.244
4. Justice Panelli's concurring and dissenting opinion
Justice Panelli concurred with Justice Mosk's opinion and in the
majority's "high probability" of death standard.2 45 His separate opinion,
however, emphasized the need for legislative attention to the second de-
gree felony-murder rule.2" He reasoned that the legislature has both the
constitutional authority and the means to define what conduct consti-
tutes second degree felony-murder and to establish appropriate punish-
ments for such crimes.24 7 Justice Panelli expressed his unease with the
court's constitutional authority to create a non-statutory crime or, alter-
natively, to increase the punishment for statutory crimes beyond that es-
tablished by the legislature.24 Justice Panelli felt that this is what the
court had done by defining "inherently dangerous felonies" as felonies
242. Id. at 640, 778 P.2d at 567, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 213 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
243. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
244. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Mosk's conclusion employed the
previous substantial risk standard although he concurred with the majority's adoption of the
high probability standard. Presumably, Justice Mosk meant that violation of section 11352 as
a whole is not so inherently dangerous that by its very nature it cannot be committed without
creating a high probability of human death.
245. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 641, 778 P.2d at 567, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 213 (Panelli, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
246. Id. (Panelli, J., concurring and dissenting).
247. Id. at 642, 778 P.2d at 568, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 214 (Panelli, J., concurring and
dissenting).
248. Id. at 641, 778 P.2d at 567-68, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 213-14 (Panelli, J., concurring and
dissenting) (citing In re Brown, 9 Cal. 3d. 612, 624, 510 P.2d 1017, 1024, 108 Cal. Rptr. 465,
472-73 (1973) for the proposition that there are, or at least should be, no non-statutory crimes
in California). See generally Jeffries, Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Stat-
utes, 71 VA. L. REv. 189 (1985) (proposition that lawmaking is essentially a legislative act).
When courts define crimes, such as second degree felony-murder, their action lies outside
the ordinary scope of the judicial function. Id at 202. In substantive criminal law, the rela-
tion between courts and legislatures is prescribed by three doctrines. The principle of legality,
or nulla poena sine lege, condemns judicial crime creation. Id. at 189. The constitutional
doctrine of void-for-vagueness prohibits unconditional legislative delegation of lawmaking au-
thority to the judiciary. Id. The third doctrine, strict construction, requires that judicial reso-
lution of residual uncertainty in the meaning of penal statutes be biased in favor of the accused.
Id.
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which create a high probability of human death.24 9 He wrote, "I am
uneasy because we have traveled very close to the edge of our role as
judges and have come perilously close to becoming legislators .... I am
not quite convinced that the second degree felony-murder rule stands on
solid constitutional ground."2 '
V. ANALYSIS
California's second degree felony-murder doctrine has reached "the
brink of logical absurdity. '251 People v. Patterson25 2 generated both sub-
stantial disagreement and unease among the supreme court justices about
the proper application of the doctrine.253 The split among the justices on
key issues of the doctrine reflects the difficulties with the doctrine as it
currently stands. Unfortunately, the court missed the opportunity
presented by Patterson to correct the problems arising from California
courts' attempts to limit the scope of the felony-murder doctrine. As a
result, California's second degree felony-murder doctrine is now more
muddled and unworkable than ever.
A. The Prior Standard
As the law stood prior to People v. Patterson,254 second degree fel-
ony-murder could only be predicated upon an inherently dangerous fel-
ony.255 This was defined as a felony that could not be created without a
substantial risk that someone would be killed.256 To determine whether
the underlying felony was inherently dangerous, courts considered the
elements of the felony in the abstract. 257 Also, courts following the
249. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 641, 778 P.2d at 567, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 213 (Panelli, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
250. Id. at 641, 778 P.2d at 567-68, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 213-14 (Panelli, J., concurring and
dissenting).
251. People v. Patterson, 247 Cal. Rptr. 885, 889 (1988) (depublished from official re-
porter), rev'd, 49 Cal. 3d 615, 778 P.2d 549, 262 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1989). The appellate court in
Patterson criticized California's requirement that application of the doctrine depend upon con-
sideration of the entire statute, including offenses unrelated to the defendant's conduct. The
court stated that "the contribution added by the Burroughs-Henderson-Lopez line of authority
has essentially brought the viewed in the abstract requirement, and the second degree felony-
murder rule itself, to the brink of logical absurdity." Id.
252. 49 Cal. 3d 615, 778 P.2d 549, 262 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1989).
253. Id. at 641, 778 P.2d at 567, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 213 (Panelli, J., concurring and
dissenting).
254. 49 Cal. 3d 615, 778 P.2d 549, 262 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1989).
255. See People v. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d 824, 833, 678 P.2d 894, 900, 201 Cal. Rptr. 319,
325 (1984).
256. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 72-91 and accompanying text.
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Burroughs-Henderson-Lopez "in its entirety" rule25 8 viewed the statute in
its entirety to determine the inherent dangerousness of acts prohibited by
the statute, unless evidence existed that the legislature intended to distin-
guish between various methods of violating the statute.259 In this exami-
nation, even nonhazardous ways of violating the statute were taken into
account.2" Under the previous application of the text, if there were any
means by which violation of the statute was not inherently dangerous to
human life, violation of the statute could not predicate a second degree
felony-murder charge.261 Applying this test to the facts in Patterson, the
proper conclusion would have been that the offense of furnishing cocaine,
prohibited by section 11352 of the California Health and Safety Code,2 62
is not an inherently dangerous felony.
Section 11352 can be violated not only by selling, furnishing or ad-
ministering controlled substances, but also by transporting a drug or
merely offering to transport or furnish it.263 The statute can also be vio-
lated if a motorist carries a small amount of cocaine with her or offers to
do so without any intent to sell or furnish the drug.2 4 This particular
means of violating section 11352 cannot reasonably be considered inher-
ently dangerous; possessing cocaine while driving does not create a sub-
stantial risk to human life. Therefore, because section 11352 could be
violated in a non-dangerous manner, it cannot predicate a second degree
felony-murder charge.
B. The Patterson Standard
The majority in People v. Patterson265 held that, to determine
whether Patterson had committed an inherently dangerous felony, the
court need only consider the crime at issue, furnishing cocaine, and not
the entire group of offenses included in section 11352 of the California
258. See supra notes 92-119 and accompanying text.
259. See People v. Henderson, 19 Cal. 3d 86, 95, 560 P.2d 1180, 1185, 137 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6
(1977).
260. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d at 830, 678 P.2d at 898, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
261. People v. Patterson, 247 Cal. Rptr. 885, 892 (1988) (depublished from official re-
porter), rev'd, 49 Cal. 3d 615, 778 P.2d 549, 262 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1989).
262. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11352 (West 1975 & Supp. 1990).
263. See id.
264. Patterson, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 893-94. Note that the particular manner in which Patter-
son violated section 11352 is not considered in this analysis. Violation of the statute is consid-
ered in the abstract and the circumstances surrounding Patterson's commission of the felony
are irrelevant.
265. 49 Cal. 3d 615, 778 P.2d 549, 262 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1989).
November 1990]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
Health and Safety Code.2 6 6 The court then defined the term "inherently
dangerous felony" for purposes of the second degree felony-murder doc-
trine to mean an offense carrying a high probability that death will re-
sult.267 Consequently, the holding represents a departure from the
standard for felony-murder as it stood prior to Patterson in two signifi-
cant respects. The Patterson court ignored the requirement that a court
view the statute in its entirety and also redefined the meaning of inherent
dangerousness.
1. The requirement that the statute be viewed in its entirety
The majority's consideration of only one element of section 11352
sharply contrasts with the Burroughs-Henderson-Lopez rule that the
court must view the statutory definition of the offense in its entirety when
determining the inherent dangerousness of a felony.268 Rather than over-
ruling the previous decisions, however, Justice Kennard purported to dis-
tinguish the foregoing authorities on the ground that in each of these the
statute proscribed a single course of conduct that can be committed in
several ways.269 To support this interpretation, Justice Kennard charac-
terized section 11352 as a statute that groups together, for legislative con-
venience, a number of related, but distinct crimes.270 This attempt to
characterize section 11352 as a statute without a primary offense is un-
persuasive for several reasons.
Justice Kennard asserted that section 11352 can be characterized as
such because the elements of the crime of transporting a controlled sub-
stance are distinct from the elements of the crime of administering a con-
trolled substance.271 However, as Justice Mosk pointed out in his
dissent, the elements of the two offenses are essentially identical. 2  The
prosecution must prove that: (1) the defendant either transported or ad-
ministered a controlled substance; (2) the defendant knew that the sub-
stance transported or administered was a controlled substance; and (3)
the quantity transported or administered was sufficient to be used as a
266. Id. at 625, 778 P.2d at 556, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 202; see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 11352 (West 1975 & Supp. 1990).
267. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 618, 778 P.2d at 551, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
268. People v. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d 824, 830, 678 P.2d 894, 898, 201 Cal. Rptr. 319, 323
(1984); People v. Henderson, 19 Cal. 3d 86, 94, 560 P.2d 1180, 1184, 137 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5
(1977); People v. Lopez, 6 Cal. 3d 45, 51, 489 P.2d 1372, 1376, 98 Cal. Rptr. 44, 48 (1971).
269. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 623-25, 778 P.2d at 555-56, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 201-02.
270. Id. at 623-25, 778 P.2d at 555-56, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 199-200.
271. Id. at 624, 778 P.2d at 556, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
272. Id. at 633-34, 778 P.2d at 562-63, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 208-09 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
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controlled substance.2 73
Justice Kennard also stated that the legislature included "more than
100 different controlled substances" into section 11352 in order to avoid
having to enact hundreds of individual statutes.2 74 She reasoned that be-
cause the statute encompasses a number of offenses merely "for the sake
of convenience, '2 75 the various offenses could be severed in order to con-
sider their inherent dangerousness individually.176 Justice Kennard of-
fered no support for this proposition, thus leading Justice Mosk to
criticize the conclusion as "sheer speculation. "277
In fact, the legislative history of section 11352 of the Health and
Safety Code reveals that the section was drafted to target a single crimi-
nal conduct: trafficking in illegal narcotics.2 78 Section 11352 was en-
acted as part of a legislative plan called the California Uniform
Controlled Substances Act.279 Chapter six of the Act listed six distinct
types of conduct that the California Legislature chose to prohibit and
punish separately.280 When section 11352 is construed, as it must
273. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting); see also CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS-CRIMINAL CALJIC No. 12.02 & Use Note (5th ed. 1988).
274. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 625, 778 P.2d at 556, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 634, 778 P.2d at 563, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 209 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
278. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
279. Ch. 1407, 1972 Cal. Stat. 2986 (1972) (codified as amended at CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 11000-11651 (West 1975 & Supp. 1990)).
280. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 635, 778 P.2d at 564, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 210 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring and dissenting); see Uniform Controlled Substances Act, ch. 1407, §§ 11350-11384, 1972
Cal. Stat. 2986, 3011-24 (codified as amended at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11350-
11383 (West 1975 & Supp. 1990). These six types of conduct are currently codified at CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11350-11355 (West 1975 & Supp. 1990). In brief, the six sec-
tions provide for the following:
Section 11350: crime-for anyone to possess a controlled substance; penalty: two to ten
years' imprisonment.
Section 11351: crime-for anyone to possess a controlled substance for sale; penalty-five
to fifteen years.
Section 11352: crime-for anyone to import or transport, sell, give away or administer a
controlled substance or to offer or attempt the same; penalty-five years to life.
Section 11353: crime-for an adult (1) to induce a minor to violate the Uniform Con-
trolled Substances Act or (2) to employ a minor to peddle a controlled substance or (3) to sell
or give a controlled substance to a minor; penalty-ten years to life.
Section 11354: crime-for a minor to do to a minor any of the acts prohibited in the
previous section; penalty-up to five years.
Section 11355: crime-for anyone to sell or furnish a nonnarcotic material while falsely
representing it to be a controlled substance; penalty-jail up to one year or prison up to ten
years.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11350-11355 (West 1975 & Supp. 1990).
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be,281 in the context of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, the legis-
lative intent of the section appears to be "'to prohibit all forms of traf-
ficking in illegal narcotics . .. "'282 By incorporating numerous
controlled substances into section 11352, the legislature addressed the
principle ways that illegal drugs are trafficked.213 Thus, the statute is
targeted at one offense rather than at several acts of criminal conduct.
The penalty provisions of section 11352 also support the view that
section 11352 prohibits essentially one course of conduct rather than a
number of related, but distinct crimes.2 4 The punishment is identical for
each act that section 11352 prohibits.2 5 This single penalty for the con-
duct prohibited reinforces the unitary nature of the targeted criminal
conduct of drug trafficking.28 6
Finally, applying the reasoning of the California Supreme Court in
People v. Henderson,287 there is no evidence of a legislative intent to dis-
tinguish between the various methods of violating the statute.288 Nor has
the legislature "evinced a particular concern" for furnishing cocaine as
opposed to other forms of trafficking in that drug "'by [providing] sepa-
rate statutory treatment, proscription, or punishment.' "289 Conse-
quently, Henderson and its progeny dictate that section 11352 be
considered unitary in nature and considered in its entirety in order to
determine whether a violation of the statute is an inherently dangerous
felony.
290
In light of the foregoing, Justice Kennard's characterization of sec-
tion 11352 as distinguishable from statutes in cases treating such statutes
as a whole must fail. Just as the statutes in Burroughs, Henderson, and
Lopez proscribe a single course of conduct that can be committed in sev-
281. "A statute must be construed 'in the context of the entire statutory system of which it
is a part, in order to achieve harmony among the parts.'" People v. Woodhead, 43 Cal. 3d
1002, 1009, 741 P.2d 154, 157, 239 Cal. Rptr. 656, 659 (1987) (quoting People v. Shirakow, 26
Cal. 3d 301, 307, 605 P.2d 859, 864, 162 Cal. Rptr. 30, 34 (1980)).
282. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 636, 778 P.2d at 564, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 210 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
283. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
284. Id. at 637, 778 P.2d at 565, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 211 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
285. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11352.
286. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 637, 778 P.2d at 565, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 211 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
287. 19 Cal. 3d 86, 560 P.2d 1180, 137 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1977).
288. Id. at 95, 560 P.2d at 1185, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
289. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 640, 778 P.2d at 567, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 213 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring and dissenting) (quoting People v. Henderson, 19 Cal. 3d 86, 95, 560 P.2d 1180, 1185, 147
Cal Rptr. 1, 6 (1977)).
290. Id. (Mosk, ., concurring and dissenting).
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eral ways, so too does section 11352. It is not, as Justice Kennard pro-
posed,291 a statute that groups together a number of related, but distinct,
crimes for legislative convenience. The legislature designed the statute to
combat one problem: drug trafficking. 29 2 The entire statute must be con-
sidered, therefore, when determining the inherent dangerousness of its
violation and, if there is any non-dangerous method of violating the stat-
ute, the statute should not predicate application of the felony-murder
doctrine.
2. The "high probability" standard
Justice Kennard's second misconstruction of precedent involved the
"inherently dangerous" requirement. The supreme court redefined the
meaning of "inherently dangerous to human life" as "high probability of
death. 293 Interestingly, the court felt it necessary to set forth for the
trial court what the supreme court characterized as a "well-established"
definition. 294 In fact, the high probability definition is not well-estab-
lished in the context of felony-murder. The definition of "inherently
dangerous" for purposes of felony-murder previously enunciated by the
California Supreme Court was substantial risk of death.295 This latter
definition originated from the common-law definition first expressed in
the 1887 English case, Regina v. Sernj.
296
The majority indicated that it borrowed its "high probability of
death" standard from second degree felony-murder cases involving im-
plied malice.2 97 A defendant is said to have acted with implied malice
when he or she "'(1) intentionally committed an act with a high
probability that it would result in death, and (2) [he or she] subjectively
appreciated the risk created by [his or her] act.' ,298 In his dissent, Chief
Justice Lucas criticized the court's application of the implied malice stan-
dard observing that "[n]otions of implied malice have never before been
imported into felony murder, where the commission of the felony itself
291. Id. at 623-25, 778 P.2d at 555-56, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 201-02.
292. See Review of Selected 1972 California Legislation, 4 PAc. L.. 378 (1973).
293. See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
294. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 626, 778 P.2d at 558, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 204.
295. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d at 833, 678 P.2d at 900, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
296. See Pike, supra note 61, at 118; see also Regina v. Sern6, 16 Cox Crim. Cas. 311 (Q.B.
1887).
297. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 629, 778 P.2d at 559, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 205 (Lucas, C.J.,
concurring and dissenting).
298. People v. Patterson, 247 Cal. Rptr. 885, 896 n.11 (1988) (depublished from official
reporter), rev'd, 49 Cal. 3d 615, 778 P.2d 549, 262 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1989) (quoting California
ex rel. Department of Transp. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 847, 856, 693 P.2d 804, 810, 210
Cal. Rptr. 219, 224-25 (1985)).
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acts as a substitute for malice.2 299
Although distinct, the felony-murder doctrine does involve elements
of implied malice. For example, implied malice has both a physical and a
mental component.00 As explained in People v. Watson,30 ' malice may
be implied when the defendant commits an act with a wanton disregard
for human life, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to
life.30 2 The second degree felony-murder doctrine eliminates the need for
the prosecution to establish the mental component required for implied
malice in that the doctrine itself acts as a substitute for the mental com-
ponent of malice.30 3 The physical requirement of implied malice and fel-
ony-murder, however, is the same.3°1 Felony-murder requires that the
defendant has committed an inherently dangerous felony, that is, an act,
the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life.30 5
Justice Kennard concluded that because the physical component of
implied malice and felony-murder are the same, satisfaction of the
mental component should be measured by the same standard. 30 6 That is,
the "high probability" standard of implied malice should be employed in
the felony-murder context to determine when an act is sufficiently dan-
gerous to support the application of the felony-murder rule. Arguably,
the previous standard of "substantial risk" satisfied the rule's purpose of
deterring the commission of inherently dangerous felonies.30 7 The new,
stricter "high probability" standard, however, better serves that pur-
pose.308 The higher the probability that death will occur, the more likely
the felon will be aware of the risk, and thus be deterred. Further, a
stricter standard for application of the felony-murder rule comports with
California courts' desire to limit the felonies for which felons can be held
299. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 629, 778 P.2d at 559-60, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 205-06 (Lucas, C.J.,
concurring and dissenting).
300. Id. at 626, 778 P.2d at 557, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 203; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 188
(West 1988).
301. 30 Cal. 3d 290, 637 P.2d 279, 179 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1981).
302. Id at 300, 637 P.2d at 285, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
303. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 626, 778 P.2d at 557, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 626, 778 P.2d at 557-58, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 203-04.
306. Id. at 627, 778 P.2d at 558, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 204. Justice Kennard wrote: "[B]y
analogy to the established definition of the term 'dangerous to life' in the context of the implied
malice element of second degree murder.., for purposes of the second degree felony-murder
doctrine, an 'inherently dangerous felony' is an offense carrying 'a high probability' that death
will result." Id.
307. Id. at 628-29, 778 P.2d at 559-60, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 205-06 (Lucas, C.J., concurring
and dissenting).
308. Patterson, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 896 n. 11.
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strictly liable for murder under the rule.30 9
C. The Effect of Patterson
The effect of Patterson on second degree felony-murder in California
is unclear. Because the majority failed to explain how courts are to de-
termine whether an entire statute must be considered when determining
the inherent dangerousness of a defendant's conduct, lower courts are
left in the dark regarding how to apply the Patterson ruling in future
felony-murder cases. Prior to Patterson, the rule was clear even though it
sometimes produced unpalatable results; if the statute could be violated
in any nondangerous manner, no violation of the statute could support a
felony-murder charge.310 The new test turns on a determination of legis-
lative intent to distinguish between offenses collected within a single stat-
ute.311 Judicial interpretation of legislative intent often poses a
formidable task and produces haphazard and unpredictable results.3"2
One clear effect of the Patterson ruling, however, is that the lower
courts may no longer be guided by the principle that the felony-murder
doctrine should be given the narrowest possible application consistent
with its ostensible purpose of deterring felons from committing their
crimes in life-threatening manners. 31 3 When faced with the felony-mur-
der doctrine on previous occasions, the California Supreme Court stated
that the strict liability doctrine "'deserves no extension beyond its re-
quired application.' ""4 Justice Kennard's strained attempt to legiti-
mately allow felony-murder charges to be premised on a violation of
section 11352 of the California Health and Safety Code31 5 reflects the
present court's willingness to expand the possible application of the fel-
ony-murder doctrine. Rather than applying the Lopez-Henderson-Bur-
roughs "in its entirety" rule to section 11352 to conclude that felony-
309. Id. The appellate court noted that deterrence is better served where the felon can
'anticipate' that death might result from his conduct. Id. According to the appellate court,
"[p]enal sanctions should not turn on a criminal's ability to read and analyze the statutory
elements of Penal Code sections; it should focus attention on the risk to the victims of the
contemplated crime." Id.
310. See supra notes 92-119 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 186-92 and accompanying text.
312. See, eg., People v. Patterson. 49 Cal. 3d 615, 778 P.2d 549, 262 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1989).
The Patterson court was split five to two on whether section 11352 of the California Health
and Safety Code encompassed severable offenses or a single, primary element. Id.
313. This principle was enunciated in People v. Henderson, 19 Cal. 3d 86, 93, 560 P.2d
1180, 1183, 137 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4 (1977).
314. People v. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d 441, 463, 668 P.2d 697, 709, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390, 402
(1983) (quoting People v. Phillips, 64 Cal. 2d 574, 582, 414 P.2d 353, 360, 51 Cal. Rptr. 225,
232 (1966)).
315. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11352 (West 1975 & Supp. 1990).
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murder cannot be premised on that statute because the statute can be
violated in a nondangerous manner, Justice Kennard distinguished the
facts of Patterson from previous authority in order to apply the felony-
murder doctrine to the crime of furnishing cocaine.316
There is at least one other clear effect of the Patterson ruling. Drug
dealers can be prosecuted under Patterson for second degree felony-mur-
der if one of their customers dies of a cocaine overdose.317 Prosecutors
must still prove, however, that selling, giving away or otherwise furnish-
ing a controlled substance creates a "high probability" that death will
result.318 As Chief Justice Lucas pointed out, this new requirement will
be virtually impossible to meet because drugs such as cocaine and heroin
are not known to be so dangerous that death is a highly probable re-
sult.3 19 Thus, despite Justice Kennard's strained attempt to enable sec-
ond degree felony-murder prosecutions of drug dealers, her high
probability standard will effectively preclude convictions for such crimes.
VI. RECOMMENDATION
As reflected by the sharply divided court in People v. Patterson,32 °
application of the judge-made doctrine of second degree felony-murder is
difficult, if not unworkable. The majority opinion of Patterson has con-
fused the application of an already muddled doctrine. If second degree
felony-murder is to remain viable in California, the doctrine requires sub-'
stantial reform. The reform should bring California's second degree fel-
ony-murder rule in line with the underlying principle of our criminal law
316. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 623-24, 778 P.2d at 555-56, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 201-02.
317. Defendants may be prosecuted for felony-murder under section 11352 of the California
Health and Safety Code if they sell, furnish, give away, or administer any number of controlled
substances to someone whose death results from ingesting those controlled substances. CAL.
HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 11352; see also Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 625, 778 P.2d at 556,
262 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
318. See Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 627, 778 P.2d at 558, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 204.
319. Id. at 628, 778 P.2d at 559, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 205 (Lucas, C.J., concurring and dissent-
ing). California prosecutors were also quick to criticize the Patterson "high probability" stan-
dard which represented a rebuff to a coalition of state and local prosecutors who had sought a
new weapon in the war against drugs by asking the court to give them more leeway to bring
murder charges when death resulted from narcotics. See Carrizosa, supra note 33, at 1, col. 2.
Michael D. Schwartz, a Ventura prosecutor who represented the California District Attorneys
Association as amicus curiae in the case, said that the court had "virtually eliminated" felony-
murder prosecutions for drug fatalities unless a drug dealer knowingly provides a fatal over-
dose or a fatally tainted substance. Hager, Court Limits Murder Charge in Drug Deaths, L.A.
Times, Sept. 8, 1989, at Al, col. 4. San Francisco Deputy District Attorney Thomas J. Borris
said, "I guess it becomes a battle of the experts." Borris conceded, "The problem is if 'high
probability' means there's more than a fifty percent chance that a person who takes cocaine is
going to die, I can't prove that." Carrizosa, supra note 33, at 1, col. 2.
320. 49 Cal. 3d 615, 778 P.2d 549, 262 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1989).
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that criminal liability is proportionate to mental culpability.321
A. The Need for Legislative Action
As Justice Panelli stated, there should not be any non-statutory
crimes in California.32 z Yet, second degree felony-murder has no express
basis in the Penal Code323 and is thus a non-statutory crime.324 The
crimes upon which a second degree felony-murder conviction should be
premised should be legislatively determined and enumerated in the Cali-
fornia Penal Code.
Although California courts have repeatedly expressed the need for
legislative action,325 namely, codification of crimes upon which second
degree felony-murder can be predicated, the legislature has not re-
sponded. The California Supreme Court, however, need not wait for leg-
islative reform. This is because the second degree felony-murder rule
remains judge-created and judge-preserved and it is within the power of
the supreme court to overturn the second degree felony-murder rule.326
Alternatively, the court should not apply the rule until the legislature
enumerates the crimes to which it may be applied.
Reform of second degree felony-murder should include the elimina-
tion of the requirement that the felony, as defined by statute, be viewed
"in the abstract" and "in its entirety" to determine the inherent danger-
ousness of the crime. The Patterson court judicially eliminated this re-
quirement, but this elimination should be codified because it is this
requirement that is at the heart of the problem with second degree fel-
ony-murder.327
B. The "Viewed in the Abstract" and "In Its Entirety" Requirements
Should Be Rejected
As People v. Patterson328 illustrates, application of the "viewed in
321. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1985).
322. People v. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d 615, 641, 778 P.2d 549, 568, 262 Cal. Rptr. 195, 214
(1989) (Panelli, J., concurring and dissenting).
323. People v. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d 824, 837, 678 P.2d 894, 903, 201 Cal. Rptr. 319, 328
(1984) (Bird, C.J., concurring).
324. See Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d at 641, 778 P.2d at 568, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 214 (Panelli, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
325. Id.; see also People v. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d 441, 472 n.19, 668 P.2d 697, 715 n.19, 194
Cal. Rptr. 390, 408 n.19 (1983).
326. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d at 503, 668 P.2d at 738, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 430 (Broussard, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
327. People v. Patterson, 247 Cal. Rptr. 885, 895 (1988) (depublished from official re-
porter), rev'd, 49 Cal. 3d 615, 778 P.2d 549, 262 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1989).
328. 49 Cal. 3d 615, 778 P.2d 549, 262 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1989).
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the abstract" and "in its entirety" requirements329 are haphazard and
unpredictable, and may lead to inequitable results.330
This requirement originated out of fear that the existence of a dead
body might lead a trier-of-fact automatically to conclude that the under-
lying felony was inherently dangerous. 331 By imposing the "viewed in
the abstract" limitation, the courts hoped to limit the reach of the disfa-
vored felony-murder doctrine.332 But in so doing, the concept widened
the gap between criminal responsibility and moral culpability by allowing
many otherwise culpable defendants to escape felony-murder prosecution
even though they had engaged in highly dangerous conduct.333 For ex-
ample, a defendant who personally injects a controlled substance of un-
known potency into another is beyond the reach of the felony-murder
rule simply because the statute prohibiting such conduct, section 11352
of the California Health and Safety Code, can be violated by the rela-
tively harmless act of offering to transport the same controlled sub-
stance.334 At the same time, less reprehensible criminal conduct might
trigger use of the rule simply because the underlying felony statute was
more narrowly drawn by the legislature and appears to proscribe inher-
ently dangerous acts when viewed in the abstract. Thus, application of
the felony-murder doctrine turns on how broadly or narrowly a statute is
drafted, not on the dangerousness of the defendant's conduct.335
The "in the abstract" requirement is unique to California.336 In
contrast, most states consider both the nature of the felony and the cir-
329. See supra notes 72-119 for a discussion of the development and application of these
requirements.
330. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of California commented that applica-
tion of the rule is so haphazard and unpredictable that it arguably poses a serious equal protec-
tion and due process problem with respect to those defendants to whom it is applied. People v.
Patterson, 247 Cal. Rptr. 885, 888 (1988) (depublished from official reporter), rev'd, 49 Cal. 3d
615, 778 P.2d 549, 262 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1989). An analysis of the equal protection and due
process problems with respect to felony-murder is beyond the scope of this Note.
331. See supra notes 72-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the creation of the "in
the abstract" requirement.
332. See People v. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d 824, 837, 678 P.2d 894, 902, 201 Cal. Rptr. 319,
327 (1984); People v. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d 441, 463, 668 P.2d 697, 709, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390, 402
(1983).
333. See supra notes 72-115 for a discussion of cases in which the defendants' conduct was
dangerous but the felony-murder convictions were reversed because the statutes violated were
held to be not inherently dangerous when viewed in the abstract.
334. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11352 (West 1975 & Supp. 1990).
335. The appellate court in Patterson stated that "remarkably, any consideration of
[whether or not furnishing cocaine is a felony inherently dangerous to life viewed in the ab-
stract] is entirely unnecessary to our decision; only the least dangerous manner of violating
Health and Safety Code section 11352 is of interest." Patterson, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 889.
336. Note, supra note 1, at 141.
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cumstances of its commission to determine whether there is inherent
danger in the commission of the crime.337 This approach recognizes that
one who is perpetrating a felony which, in the abstract, seems not to
involve any element of human risk, may either resort to a dangerous
method of committing such felony or make use of dangerous force to
prevent others from interfering with its commission.
33 s
The purpose of the felony-murder rule is to furnish an added deter-
rent to the perpetration of felonies which by their nature create a foresee-
able risk of death.339 As the California Supreme Court explained, during
the commission of inherently dangerous felonies, the potential felon can
anticipate that an injury or death might arise solely from the fact that he
will commit a felony.34  It seems equally true that during the commis-
sion of a seemingly innocuous felony, the potential felon can anticipate
that an injury or death might arise if he commits the felony in a danger-
ous manner. If the felon would be deterred by a foreseeable risk of death,
it is irrelevant for purposes of deterrence whether that risk stems from
the nature of the felony itself or the dangerous manner in which it is
committed. To determine, therefore, whether a particular felony is in-
herently dangerous-creates a foreseeable risk of death-both the nature
and the circumstances surrounding its commission should be
considered.341
A consideration of both the nature of the felony and the circum-
stances surrounding its commission is preferable to California's in the
abstract and in its entirety approach because it satisfies the deterrence
purpose of the felony-murder rule without expanding the gap between
criminal responsibility and moral culpability. Under the proposed ap-
proach, application of the felony-murder doctrine would no longer turn
on statutory construction. Appropriately, the dangerousness of the de-
fendant's conduct and the risk to human life would determine the doc-
trine's application.
337. Id.; see, eg., People v. Auilar, 59 Ill. 2d 95, 319 N.E.2d 514 (1974) (consideration of
particular circumstances surrounding commission of felony is permitted); People v. Wilder,
411 Mich. 328, 266 N.W.2d 847 (1978) (jury may consider facts and circumstances of perpe-
tration of felony); People v. Bradley, 541 N.Y.S.2d 460, 150 A.D.2d 592 (1988) (surrounding
circumstances may be considered to convict for felony-murder).
338. See R. PERKINS & R. BoycE, CRIMINAL LAW 66 (3d ed. 1982).
339. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d at 833, 678 P.2d at 900, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
340. People v. Williams, 63 Cal. 2d 454, 457 n.4, 406 P.2d 647, 650 n.4, 47 Cal. Rptr. 7, 10
n.4 (1965).
341. See Jenkins v. State, 230 A.2d 262, 269 (Del. 1967). People v. Golson, 32 Inl. 2d 398,
207 N.E.2d 68 (1965), cerL denied, 384 U.S. 1023 (1966); State v. Williams, 284 N.C. 67, 199
S.E.2d 409 (1973); see also Gore v. Leeke, 261 S.C. 308, 199 S.E.2d 755 (1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 958 (1974).
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Fear of "unjustifiable bootstrapping"' 42 simply because a death oc-
curred during the commission of the felony is not a sufficient reason to
withhold consideration of the circumstances surrounding the death. The
appellate court in Patterson criticized the fear of "plac[ing] too little faith
in our jury system., 343 As the court explained, in implied malice cases,
juries are asked to make similar evaluations and presumably are able to
do so fairly.34
For these reasons, consideration of the circumstances surrounding
the commission of the felony, in addition to the nature of the felony it-
self, represents a more sound approach to the application of the felony-
murder doctrine than does the "viewed in the abstract" and "in its en-
tirety" provisions. Therefore, the "in the abstract" and "in its entirety"
requirements should be abolished in California.
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite widespread criticism of felony-murder, the doctrine contin-
ues to survive, at least in theory, in California. However, the doctrine
has developed without statutory guidelines, resulting in the prosecution
of felons for felony-murder without regard to their moral culpability. 341
The Patterson opinion does little to clear up the state of confusion sur-
rounding California's second degree felony-murder doctrine. What the
opinion seems to offer with one hand-namely, the ability to sever seem-
ingly dangerous crimes from broad statutes so that the particular offense
can be considered when determining the inherent dangerousness of the
defendant's crime-it takes away with the other: the high probability
standard of inherent dangerousness is more difficult to meet than the pre-
vious substantial risk standard.
Legislators, acting under political pressure, are understandably re-
luctant to abolish the felony-murder rule altogether for fear that they
might appear soft on crime. The need to reform the doctrine, however, is
apparent if second degree felony-murder is to be rescued from its current,
precarious position at "the brink of logical absurdity. '3 46 The California
Legislature should act to clarify the scope of second degree felony-mur-
der and to bring the doctrine into line with well-accepted criteria of indi-
vidual accountability and proportionate punishment. Specifically, the
342. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d at 830, 678 P.2d at 898, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
343. Patterson, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
344. Id.; see also People v. Protopappas, 201 Cal. App. 3d 152, 246 Cal. Rptr. 915 (1988).
345. See People v. Patterson, 247 Cal. Rptr. 885, 895 (1988) (depublished from official re-
porter), rev'd, 49 Cal. 3d 615, 778 P.2d 549, 262 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1989).
346. Id. at 889.
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legislature should codify second degree felony-murder and enumerate the
crimes to which it may be applied. In the alternative, the California
Supreme Court should reassess and eliminate its requirements that the
offense, as defined by statute, be viewed in the abstract and in its entirety
to determine the inherent dangerousness of the crime and, thus, the ap-
plicability of the felony-murder rule.
M. Susan Doyle*
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